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DOCUMENTS OF TITLE: A COMPARISON OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND OTHER
UNIFORM ACTS, WITH EMPHASIS ON
MICHIGAN LAW*
Douglass Boshkofft
N 1909 the Michigan legislature enacted the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act and two years later adopted its companion,
the Uniform Bills of Lading Act. These two acts were followed
by the Uniform Sales Act which went into effect in 1913. The first
two acts are devoted exclusively to the subject of documents of
title. The Sales Act contains some parallel provisions relating to
the negotiation and transfer of such documents.
Currently, a committee of the Michigan State Bar Association
is studying and evaluating the 1958 official text of the Uniform
Commercial Code which has already been adopted in eight states."
Article 7 of the Code, dealing with the subject of documents of title,
is a marriage of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts and Bills of Lading Acts and, as is true in most marriages, the parties are changed by
the ceremony. The purpose of this discussion is to examine article 7 against the background of Michigan cases and statutes with
the hope that it will stimulate discussion of one part of the Code
and provide some foundation for reader evaluation. It can be expected that the study now under way in Michigan will have future
counterparts in other jurisdictions.
Although this article is mainly oriented toward the legal materials of one jurisdiction, the presence of a fairly common
background of uniform acts makes it relevant to other jurisdictions, except where there are contrary interpretations of a particular statutory provision. Therefore, parallel citations to the
*This article is a by-product of a study of Article 7 of the Uniform Commercial
Code prepared for a committee of the Michigan State Bar Association, but the views
expressed are those of the author and are not to be attributed either to the Bar Association
or to any of its committees.
Article 7 has received some previous attention, although relatively slight in volume
compared to comments on some other articles of the Code. BRAUCHER, Documrs OF
Trruz (1958) is the best and most detailed analysis of article 7 and is referred to throughout this article.
t Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University.- Ed.
1Kentucky, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Connecticut (effective October 1, 1961),
New Hampshire (effective July 1, 1961), and Rhode Island (effective January 1, 1962). See
Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code: Review, Assessment, Prospect- November 1959,
15 Bus. LAW. 348, 353 (1960) and Moore, Developments in Factoring, Inventory Liens and
Accounts Receivable Financing, 15 Bus. l.w. 995 (1960). Arkansas and Wyoming have
recently joined the list of states enacting the Code. CCH CoPX. L. GumE, No. 56, p. 7
(March 14, 1961).
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various uniform acts have been provided with the hope that this
article will be of assistance to other groups attempting to evaluate
article seven of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Before dealing with specific topics, a brief survey of the current
statutory scheme is worthwhile. The most comprehensive regulation of documents of title is found in the Uniform Warehouse
Receipts2 and Bills of Lading Acts3 which set forth the obligations of warehousemen and carriers, and define the rights of persons who deal in documents representing goods held by such
bailees. The Uniform Sales Act 4 covers only the rights of persons buying and selling these documents and in the case of inconsistent treatment the first two acts control.5 These acts, hereinafter referred to as the UWRA, UBLA, and USA, respectively,
would be specifically repealed by the Code.6 Scattered elsewhere
throughout the Michigan statutes are other acts, ranging from
7
ancient to modern, which are also relevant to the discussion.
Warehouse receipts, in particular, have been the beneficiaries of
legislative attention. Apart from UWRA, statutes were passed
in 1846, 1895, 1905, and 19391 which in some cases contain duplicating or contradictory provisions. Thus the contents of a ware2 MIcH. Comp. LAws 443.1-.58 (1948), MxCH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.421-.478 (1959).
3 MxcH. Comp. LAws §§ 482.1-.54, .56 (1948), MxcIC.STAT. ANN §§ 22.1121-.1174, .1176
(1959).
4 MiCH. Coup. LAWs §§ 440.27-.40 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.267-.280 (1959).
5 MIcH. Comp. LAws § 440.76 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.318 (1959).
6 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10-102. See also § 10-103.
7Mxci. COMp. LAws §§ 285.61-.80, .82 (1948), MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 12.119(1)-(20),
(22) (1958) (Farm Produce Storage Act); MicHx. COMp. LAWs §§ 434.101-.112 (1948),
MiCH. STAT. ANN. §§ 18.721-.732 (1959) (disposition of unclaimed property); MICH. COMe.
LAws §§ 440.27-.40 (1948), MxcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.267-.280 (1959) (Uniform Sales Act);
Mxcir. Comp. LAws §§ 443.1.58 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.421-.478 (1959) (Uniform
Warehouse Receipts Act); MICH. Com. LAws §§ 444.1-.27 (1948), MIcH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 19A91-.517 (1959) (regulating warehouses); MICH. Coin'. LAWs §§ 444.101-.109 (1948),
MIxH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.521-.529 (1959) (warehousing of farm produce); MxCH. Comp.
LAws §§ 462.2-.50 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 22.21-.68 (1959) (Railroad Commission);
MxcI. COMp. LAWs §§ 466.20-21 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN §§ 22279-.280 (1959) (criminal
provisions relating to bills of lading predating the Uniform Bills of Lading Act); MICH.
COMp. LAWS § 467.151 (1948), Mxcii. STAT. ANN. § 22.1182 (1959) (liability of railroads);
MICH. Com. LAws § 468.321 (1948), MxCH. STAT. ANN. § 22.751 (1959) (sale of perishable
freight by carriers); MxCH. CoMp. LAWs § 469.461 (1948), Mxca. STAT. ANN. § 22.1081
(1959) (grain deliveries by railroads); MICH. Com. LAws §§ 469.501-.502 (1948), Micii.
STAT. ANN. §§ 22.1191-.1192 (1959) (liability of railroads); MICH. COMp. LAws §§ 482.1-.56
(1959), MxCH. STAT. ANN. §§ 22.1121-.1176 (Uniform Bills of Lading Act); McIH. COM.
LAws § 483227 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1297 (1959) (pipe line companies).
8MxcH. CoMp. LAws §§ 434.101-.112 (1948), MxCH. STAT. ANN. §§ 18.721-.732 (1959);
MICH. Com. LAws §§ 444.1-.27 (1948), Micx. STAT. ANN. §§ 19A91-.517 (1959); MicH.
Comp. LAws §§ 444.101-.109 (1948), Mxcir. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.521-.529 (1959); MICH. COMp.
LAws §§ 285.61-.80, .82 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 12.119(1)-(20), (22) (1959).
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house receipt are set forth in four separate enactments.9 Under the
UWRA the negotiability of a warehouse receipt is determined by
its delivery terms, and negotiability cannot be destroyed by a
stipulation of non-negotiability inserted in the receipt. 10 An earlier
statute, still in existence, provides that all warehouse receipts are
negotiable unless marked non-negotiable." This obvious contradiction is resolved because the UWRA repealed all inconsistent
legislation, 12 but the fact remains that the lawyer consulting the
statutes must, in this and other situations, decide to what extent
they are inconsistent, whether they are repealed by legislation,
and whether more than one statute is applicable. The Attorney
General of Michigan has taken the reasonable position that all
statutes predating the UWRA are still in force unless plainly in3
consistent.'
Consideration of the Code is worthwhile even if it only forces
a survey of the law we now have in this area; but if the Code is
enacted, more study is demanded because article 7 will not replace
all existing statutes pertaining to documents of title. Here it is
recognized that there is likely to be widespread state regulation
of the persons or firms offering storage or shipping services and
also substantial differences of opinion as to the extent and manner
of such regulation. Therefore, the Code attempts merely to deal
with the rights created by the issuance of documents of title and
leaves regulation of the bailees' services to the several states. Thus
section 10-104 provides:
"The Article on Documents of Title (Article 7) does not
repeal or modify any laws prescribing the form or contents
of documents of title or the services or facilities to be afforded
by bailees, or otherwise regulating bailees' businesses in respects not specifically dealt with herein; but the fact that such
laws are violated does not affect the status of a document
with the definition of a docuof title which otherwise complies
14
ment of title (Section 1-201)."
9MxcH. CoMP. LAws § 285.69 (1948), MicH. STAT. ANN. § 12.119(9) (1959); MICH.
COMP. LAws § 4432 (1948), MicH. STAT. ANN. § 19.422 (1959); MscH. COMP. LAWS § 444.7
(1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.497 (1959); MIir. COmp. LAWS § 444.101 (1948), MxCH.
STAT. ANN. § 19.521 (1959).
10MxcH. CoMP. LAWs §§ 443.3-.5 (1948), MicH. STAT. ANN. §9 19.424-.425 (1959).
21MICH. COMP. LAWS § 444.8 (1948), MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 19.498 (1959).
1.2 UNFORM WAREHOUSE REcms Acr, 60 Mich. Laws 1909, No. 303, § 59 (repealed
by Public Act 267, 1945, on the theory that it was no longer necessary).
I3 [1917] MicH. Arr'Y GEN. REP. 358.
14 See also UNIFORM COMMERcIAL CODE § 7-103, §7-201, comment.
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The present statutes contain a mixture of regulatory and substantive provisions. A good illustration is the Farm Produce Storage Act of 1939 which contains licensing provisions which are
clearly regulatory15 and also defines the rights of a depositor of
commingled fungible farm produce, 6 equally clearly a matter
within the scope of article 7.17 If this statute were left untouched,
it could be a booby trap for the unwary.' Thus, serious consideration of the Code would also require careful examination of the
Michigan statutes.
Returning to the Code, we will see that the marriage ceremony
proposed by article 7 has caused some changes. Many of these are
not revolutionary but evolutionary. Fifty years of operation under
the UWRA, UBLA and USA have indicated a need for reconsideration of some of their provisions. Further, although there
have been changes in detail, many of the new concepts in article 7
come not from the changed statutory language but in provision
for situations on which the present acts are silent. Lastly, there
are changes required by new concepts in the law of sales.
I.

TRANSACTIONS SUBJECT TO CODE PROVISIONS

A.

Multi-State Transactions

If all parts of a transaction involving a document of title occur
in Michigan then the law of this state is obviously applicable, but
there are situations in which several jurisdictions may be involved.
For instance, a receipt issued by an Ohio warehouse might be
pledged in Michigan, a bill of lading for goods shipped between
Detroit and New York might be pledged in Massachusetts, or an
overseas bill of lading for goods shipped from England to Detroit
might be negotiated in Michigan. In any of these situations if suit
is brought in Michigan to adjudicate rights conferred by the particular document of title, the Michigan court must initially make
a choice as to the applicable law.
15E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 285.70 (1948), MicH. STAT. ANN. § 12.119(10) (1959)
(failure to issue proper receipt grounds for revocation of license).
16 MicH. Coarp. LAws § 285.73 (1948), MxcH. STAT. ANN. § 12.119(13) (1959).
17 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-207 (2).
18 A word of explanation: inconsistent, parallel or interlocking statutes are no booby
trap for the diligent lawyer who has the time to puzzle through the legalistic maze; but
the diligent may sometimes be hurried by a client and, even if he is not, why should he
be forced to reconcile different statutes when the need for such statutes is not dear? His
life is already made difficult by the constant onrush of new statutes, decisions, and administrative rulings. He is entitled to a set of statutes which are as dear as the legislature
can make them; in this area a good spring cleaning is in order.
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Insofar as there is, in any of these cases, a federal enactment
governing the rights of the parties, federal law must be applied. 9
Perhaps the most familiar example is the Federal Bills of Lading
Act,20 which applies when a bill of lading is issued by a common
carrier in interstate commerce or in foreign commerce where the
originating point of shipment is in the United States. 2 1 But this
act does not apply to a bill of lading issued in London for shipment to Detroit,22 and, while other federal statutes govern some
aspects of the transaction, none spell out the rights of a person
23
taking the bill of lading as a purchaser in Michigan.
Unlike the Uniform Acts which it replaces, the Code establishes
a choice of law rule which is applicable to documents of title. It
isas follows:
"....

[W]hen a transaction bears a reasonable relation to

this state and also to another state or nation the parties may
agree that the law either of this state or of such other state
or nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such
agreement this Act applies '24
to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.

Neither "reasonable" nor "appropriate" is defined in the Code
25

although there are official comments explaining the concepts.

19 UNIFoM COMMER rAL CODE § 7-103.
203 9 Stat. 538-45 (1916), 49 U.S.C. §§ 81-124 (1958).
2139 Stat. 538 (1916), 49 U.S.C. § 81 (1958).
22 Archibald & Lewis Co. v. Banque Internationale de Commerce, 216 App. Div. 322,
214 N.Y. Supp. 366 (1926); Chesapeake & O.R.R. v. State Nat1 Bank, 280 Ky. 444, 133
S.WA2d 511 (1939) (dictum); 2 WE.LLSrON, SALE § 406a (1948).
23 Neither the Harter Act, 27 Stat. 445-46 (1893), 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-96 (1958), nor the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 49 Stat. 1207-13 (1986), 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1958), prescribe the requirements of proper negotiation of an ocean bill of lading. If the bill was
issued for a shipment from London to Detroit, Michigan law could properly be applied
to resolve this issue.
There is little federal law pertinent to warehousing. The United States Warehouse
Act, 39 Stat. 486-91 (1916), 7 U.S.C. §§ 241-73 (1958), regulates the warehousing of goods
stored for interstate or foreign commerce or in a warehouse located in a place under
exclusive federal jurisdiction. See also 54 Stat. 1019 (1940), 7 U.S.C. § 608 (f) (1958).
This2 4regulation would not substantially conflict with state regulation under the Code.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105 (1).
25
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105, comments 1 and 2 state:
"I. Subsection (1) states affirmatively the right of the parties to a multi-state transaction or a transaction involving foreign trade to choose their own law. That right... is
limited to jurisdictions to which the transaction bears a 'reasonable relation.' In general,
the test of 'reasonable relation' is similar to that laid down by the Supreme Court in
Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co.... Ordinarily the law chosen must be that of a
jurisdiction where a significant enough portion of the making or performance of the
contract is to occur or occurs. But an agreement as to choice of law may sometimes take
effect as a shorthand expression of the intent of the parties as to matters governed by their
agreement, even though the transaction has no significant contact with the jurisdiction
chosen.
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There are no Michigan cases delineating choice of law principles applicable to documents of title.26 Suppose that negotiable
warehouse receipts issued in a foreign jurisdiction are pledged in
Michigan. Orthodox conflicts principles would indicate a reference to the law of the situs of the property for a determination of
the pledge's validity. 27 However, if the code was in effect and suit
was brought in Michigan and it was found, absent any agreement as
to the applicable law, that the pledge created an appropriate relationship with this state, Michigan law would apply to all aspects
28
of the transaction.
B.

Specific Types of Intra-State Transactions

Because of broadened definitions of persons and documents
governed by its provisions, the Code would bring to Michigan a
more comprehensive set of rules applicable to documents of title.
At present only warehouse receipts and bills of lading issued by a

common carrier receive complete statutory attention because of
"2.

Where there is no agreement as to the governing law, the Act is applicable to

any transaction having an 'appropriate' relation to any state which enacts it. Of course,
the Act applies to any transaction which takes place in its entirety in a state which has
enacted the Act. But the mere fact that suit is brought in a state does not make it

appropriate to apply the substantive law of that state. Cases where a relation to the
enacting state is not 'appropriate' include, for example, those where the parties have
dearly contracted on the basis of some other law, as where the law of the place of con-

tracting and the law of the place of contemplated performance are the same and are
contrary to the law under the Code."
26

No inquiry has been made into the question whether a Michigan court would

draw upon contract principles in resolving multi-state document of title questions. Stipu.
lations in various contracts concerning the applicable law have been validated where the
stipulated state is the place of contracting, Rubin v. Gallagher, 294 Mich. 124, 292 N.W.
584 (1940), or the place of performance, Russell v. Pierce, 121 Mich. 208, 80 N.W. 118
(1899). See also Richardson v. Rogers, 45 Mich. 591, 8 N.W. 526 (1881).
27 Hallgarten

v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1 (1883); Swedish-American Nat'l Bank v. First

Nat'l Bank (In re St. Paul & K. C. Grain Co.), 89 Minn. 98, 94 N.W. 219 (1903).
28 Under the proposed draft of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, the question
to a chattel is
whether a particular document can, under any circumstances, control title
determined by the law of the situs of the property at the time the document was issued.
REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CoNFLiCr OF LAws § 261 (1) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959). If there
is an affirmative answer to this question, the validity of a conveyance of an interest in
the chattel is determined by the law of the situs of the chattel at the time of the conveyance. In most cases this will mean a reference to the law of the jurisdiction where
the document itself was transferred. Id. §§ 261 (2), (3). Section 1-105 (1) of the Code
abandons this scheme of reference and, where an appropriate relationship is found, commands courts in states adopting the Code to apply it to all aspects of the transaction. Cf.
id. § 98 (1), comments dy h; § 99 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957); § 346n (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1960).
See also Goodrich, Conflicts Niceties and Commercial Necessities, 1952 Wis. L. REv.
199; Hawkland, In Re Articles 1, 2 and 6, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 512 (1955); BRAUCHEa, DocuMENTs OF TrrLE 6-8, 13-15 (1958); NEw YoRK LAw REVISION COMM'N, STUDY OF THE UNIFORm CoMMERcLAL CODE 175-80, 1767-72, 1781-84 (1955); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 106, § 1-105,
notes (1958).
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the limited definitions of documents subject to the UWRA and
UBLA.2 9 If a bill of lading is issued by a contract carrier it is not
subject to the UBLA. 30 Delivery orders are documents of title
under the definition contained in the USA, 31 but that act deals
only with the transfer or negotiation of documents.
This is changed by the Code. All documents of title are subject to the provisions of article 7. "Documents of title" include
bills of lading, warehouse receipts, dock warrants, dock receipts,
delivery orders and any other document "which in the regular
course of business or financing is treated as adequately evidencing
that the person in possession of it is entitled to receive, hold and
dispose of the document and the goods it covers." 32 The definition
is very broad; drawn from the USA, 33 it permits incorporation
of subsequently-developed documents serving the same purpose as
34
those now in use.
II.

DEFINITION AND

A.

FoRM

OF DOCUMENTS

OF TITLE

Requirements for All Documents

All documents of title within the scope of article 7 must purport to be issued or addressed to a bailee and to cover goods in the
bailee's possession which are either identified or fungible portions
of an identified mass. 35 A bailee is defined as a person who acknowledges possession of goods and contracts to deliver them. 36
The alternatives "issued or addressed" are necessary to cover docu29
0Only bills of lading issued by a common carrier are governed by the Uniform Bills
of Lading Act. MICH. Comp. LAws § 482.1 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1121 (1937).
There is no express limitation in the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, but it does not
purport to apply to any document but a warehouse receipt. See the definitions of warehouse receipt and warehouseman contained in MICH. ComP. LAws § 443.57 (1948), MxcH.
STAT. ANN. § 19.477 (1959).
30 A common carrier is one which undertakes to transport personal property for all
who may choose to employ him and is engaged in rendering a public service. Michigan
Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Krol, 245 Mich. 297, 222 N.W. 718 (1929). See also, In re Border
Cities Trucking Co., 261 Mich. 885, 246 N.W. 184 (1933); In re Columbian Storage &
Transfer Co., 261 Mich. 890, 246 N.W. 185 (193); Comment, 36 MICH. L. REv. 802 (1938).
31 MICH. CoMp. LAWs § 440.76 (1) (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.316 (1) (1959).
32 UNIFORM COMiERCIAL CODE § 1-201 (15), referred to by § 7-102 (1) (e).
33 MxcH. CoMp. LAws § 440.76 (1) (1948), MxcI. STAT. ANN. § 19.316 (1) (1959).
34 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201, comment 15, indicates that a dock warrant
is not to be considered a document of title unless so treated by trade usage. This part
of the comment does not seem to be supported by the language of § 1-201 (15) since
trade usage appears relevant only as to those documents not specifically listed.
35 UNIFORM COMMaERCIAL CODE § 1-201 (15). Compare the definition of document of
title contained in UNIFORM SALEs ACr, § 76 (1), MICH.Comxp. LAws § 440.76 (1) (1948), MICH.

§ 19.316 (1) (1959).
SO UNIFORM ComMECxAL CODE § 7-102(1) (a).

STAT. ANN.
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ments originating with a bailee, such as warehouse receipts, and
documents originating with a bailor, such as delivery orders.
B. Special Definitions of Warehouse Receipts,
Bills of Lading, and Delivery Orders
In addition to conforming to the requirements of section
1-201 (15), under the general definition of a document of tide,
a warehouse receipt must be issued by a person engaged in the
business of storing goods for hire.3 7 This would change present
law since only a person lawfully engaged in storing goods for
profit may now issue a receipt subject to the UWRA.38 Thus the
Code covers warehouse receipts issued by state operated or cooperative warehouses.39
What happens when a person issues warehouse receipts for
his own goods? It was held, prior to enactment of the UWRA in
Michigan, that a warehouseman, as defined by a statute then in
force, could make a valid pledge of his own goods through the
use of warehouse receipts. 40 The Code does not change this. But
if the person issuing a document for his own goods is not within
the Code definition of a warehouseman, then the receipt is not a
document of title.41 In such a case the holder of the receipt clearly
acquires the issuer's obligation of due care and delivery, 42 but
43
apparently the other provisions of article 7 are not applicable.
Moreover, the issuer would not be able to claim a lien for storage
under the terms of article 7.44 On the other hand, it has been held
in Michigan that a person storing goods is not prevented from
asserting a lien arising from a contract of storage by the fact that
45
he does not meet the statutory definition of warehouseman,
and the Code does not compel a contrary conclusion.
One exception to this discussion should be noted. Where receipts are issued by an owner who is not a warehouseman they are,
under the Code, considered of like effect as warehouse receipts
1-201 (45), 7-102(1) (Ih),7-201.
CoMP. LAws §§ 443.1, .57 (1948), MIcI. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.421, .477 (1959).

87 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§

38 MICH.

89 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-201, comment.
40 Merchants & Mfrs. Bank v. Hibbard, 48 Mich. 118, 11 N.W. 834 (1882).
41 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-201 (45), 7-102 (1) (h), -201 (1).
42 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 7-401 (c), (d), 7-203 (liability for non-receipt and
misdescription), 7-204 (duty of care).
43 See BRAUCHER, DOCUMms OF TrrLE 9-10 (1958).
44 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 7-206, -209, -210.
45 Schneider v. Dayton, 111 Mich. 396, 69 N.W. 829 (1897). See also 2 WILLSroN,
SALEs § 407 (a) (1948).
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if issued under a statute requiring a bond against withdrawal
or a
46
license for issuance, such as in the case of distilled spirits.
Under the Code, a warehouseman may, but is under no obligation to, issue warehouse receipts. This represents no change in
Michigan law' 7 as found in the UWRA. However, another Michigan statute, the Farm Produce Storage Act of 1939, obligates warehousemen subject to its provisions to issue such receipts. 4 This
latter statute would remain in force, since state regulatory statutes
are preserved insofar as they do not affect obligations imposed by
the Code. 40
A bill of lading is newly defined by the Code to be a "document evidencing the receipt of goods for shipment issued by a person engaged in the business of transporting or forwarding goods,
and includes an airbill." 50 Thus bills of lading issued by contract
carriers and freight forwarders are within the statutory definition.
The UBLA does not contain a comparable definition, and the act
does not apply to contract carriers."' Also, a delivery order is
specially defined to be a written order to deliver goods, addressed
to a person who in the ordinary course of business issues warehouse
receipts or bills of lading.5 2
C.

Destination Bills of Lading

One of the most noteworthy innovations is the Code's authorization of a destination bill.53 Traditionally, bills of lading have
been issued to the shipper at the originating point of shipment.
If the shipment is by air from Detroit to Flint it is possible that
the goods will reach their destination in only a few hours. Where
there is a sale of the goods, shipper may want a cash payment. He

may send the package c.o.d. or, alternatively, draw a draft on buyer
and transmit it to his collecting agent along with the bill of lading.
If he chooses the latter course of action, the goods will probably
arrive long before the documents.
46 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-201 (2).
47 Compare UNIFORM COMMuERCIAL CODE § 7-201 (1) and UNIFORM WAREHOUSE
CErTs Aar, §1, MICH. Courp. LAWs § 443.1 (1948), fici. STAT. ANN. § 19.421 (1959).

R-

48MicH. CoMP. LAWs § 285.69 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 12.119(9) (1958).
49 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 7-103, -201, comment, § 10-104; but cf. § 10-102 (1).
50 UNIFORM COMIERCIAL CODE § 1-201 (6).
51 UNrrORm BiLS OF LADING Acr § I, MficH. CoMP. LAws § 482.1

ANN. § 22.1121 (1937).
52 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-102 (1)(d).
53 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-305.

(1948), Micr. STAT.
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In order to eliminate possible delay in this situation, the Code
permits issuance of a destination bill of lading by the carrier on
the request of the consignor or any person entitled to the goods
under an already-issued bill of lading. In the latter case the outstanding document must be surrendered. The carrier can issue
shipper a receipt in Detroit containing its promise to issue a bill
of lading at Flint. While the carrier wires its agent at Flint to issue
the destination bill to seller's agent there, seller can wire his agent,
presumably a bank in Flint, a draft on buyer. Thus, the transaction can be completed promptly and to the advantage of all
parties. This section of the Code, however, is only permissive and
4
not mandatory.5
D. Essential Terms
At present in Michigan, while neither bills of lading nor warehouse receipts need be in any particular form, they must contain
certain terms. Liability is imposed in favor of any person injured
by the omission of an essential term from a negotiable bill or warehouse receipt.55 The Code would make several changes.
1. Essential terms are listed only for warehouse receipts.5 6
Nothing is said about bills of lading, evident because it was
thought that the contents should be determined by state regu7
latory agencies.y
2. Under the UWRA it might be argued that a warehouse
receipt not containing an essential term was invalid. The
Code makes it clear that despite such an omission the receipt
is still a document of title. 8
54For a discussion of the destination bill antedating the Code, see Comment, 65
HRv.L. Rv. 1392 (1952).
55 MIcH. ComP. LAws § 482.2 (1948), MiCR. STAT. ANN. § 22.1122 (1937); MicH. COMP.
LAWS § 443.2 (1948), MicH. STAT. ANN. § 19.422 (1959).
56 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-202 (2). The essential terms parallel those required
by UNIFORM WAREHOUSE REcEIPTs Acr § 2, MIcH. Comp. LAws § 443.2 (1948), MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 19.422 (1959), except that in the case of a field warehousing receipt the rate of
storage and handling charges need not be stated. A statement that the document is a
field warehouse receipt, however, is required.
To determine what are essential terms other Michigan statutes should be consulted.
Most important is § 9 of the Farm Produce Act of 1939, MICH. CoMP. LAws § 285.69
(1948), MicH. STAT. ANN. § 12.119(l) (1958), which imposes additional requirements
upon receipts subject to its provisions. There must be a statement of the net weight and
percentage of dockage together with grade established and a statement as to whether
the farm produce is to be commingled or separately stored.
See also the other statutes cited note 8 supra, which impose further requirements
unless repealed by enactment of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act.
57 BitAucHta, DocumExTs OF TrI= 12-13 (1958).
58 UNIFORM COHHmMCIAL CODE §§ 7-202, -401 (a); cf. MICH. ComrP. LAws § 443.2 (1948),
Micx. STAT. ANN. § 19.422 (1959). For a discussion whether such an argument should be
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8. The liability for omission of an essential term, in the
case of a warehouse receipt, can be enforced by any person
whether the receipt is negotiable or non-negotiable. 9 At
present, except in the case of warehouse receipts for farm
produce, only omission from a negotiable receipt creates a
statutory liability.60 Nothing is said in the Code about liability for omission of an essential term from a bill of lading.61
E. Limitations of Liability
Section 3 of the UBLA, as enacted in Michigan states:

2

"A carrier may insert in a bill issued by him any other
terms and conditions, provided that such terms and conditions shall not:
(a) Be contrary to law or public policy; or
(b) In any wise impair his obligation to exercise at least
that degree of care in the transportation and safe-keeping
of the goods entrusted to him which a reasonably careful
man would exercise in regard to similar goods of his
own."
It is further stated that the carrier may escape liability for a variance between the goods and their description in the bill of lading
by the use of "said to contain" or "shipper's load and count" to
indicate that carrier is uncertain as to the contents of the packages
shipped.63 The UWRA contains corresponding provisions.64
The question then arises whether the bailee may disclaim responsibility for the goods under any other circumstances. Frohlich
v. Pennsylvania Co.,65 a Michigan case decided before adoption
of the UBLA, furnishes a typical set of facts. In that case, the conaccepted, see BRAUCHm,

DocUmENm OF TrrLE 11 (1958); 2 WILISTON, SALES § 407 (a)

(1948); Investment Serv. Co. v. O'Brien, 190 Ore. 394, 233 P.2d 163 (1950).
59 UNFORM COMMiERCIAL CODE § 7-202 (2).
60 MicH. CoMP. LAws § 482.2 (1948), MicH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1122 (1937); MIcH. Coarp.
LAws § 443.2 (1948), MxciH. STAT. ANN. § 19.422 (1959). In the case of farm produce ware-

house receipts, liability is extended to omissions from non-negotiable receipts. MICH.
CorP. LAws § 285.69 (j) (1948), MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 12.119 (9) (j) (1958).
61 There is not, however, a negative implication that there would be no liabilities for
omission from a bill of lading of an essential term under regulations of a state railroad
commission or like body. See UNIFORM CoMMERciAL. CODE §§ 7-103, -105.
62 MIcH. CofP. LAws § 482.3 (1948), MxcH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1123 (1937).
63
UNIFORMf BILLS OF LADING Aar § 23, NicH. CoMp. LAws § 482.23 (1948), Mici.
STAT. ANN. § 22.1143 (1937).
-caIrs
Acr §§ 3, 20, Mximi. CoMiP. LAws §§ 443.3, .20 (1948),
64 UNIFORM WAREHOUSE R
Micm. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.423, .440 (1959).
65 138 Mich. 116, 101 N.W. 223 (1904).
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signor, acting as agent for the consignee, selected a freight car
thought to be suitable for shipment of some mirrors. The carrier
had furnished several cars in order that the consignor might choose
one, and it apparently was agreed that the carrier should not be
liable if the car proved to be unsatisfactory. The car selected was
not fit for the use intended and the court held that in accordance
with the agreement the carrier would not be liable for the ensuing
damage unless the defect was not discoverable through inspection.
In another case68 it was held that a bill of lading proviso-"box
car loaded with perishable freight at shipper's request and shipper's risk"-was not invalidated by the quoted section of the UBLA
where the shipper accepted an uninsulated box car as an alternative to waiting for a suitable car.
A statement that the car was inspected by the shipper will not
relieve the carrier from liability if the shipper has no choice.67
These three cases indicate that the carrier cannot disclaim liability
for risks of carriage unless it is asked to take an unusual risk and
does not have available the right car for the shipment. In this
case it may ask the shipper to delay shipment or assume the risk
himself.
There is a somewhat similar case involving warehouse receipts.
In Pursev. DetroitHarborTerminals68 potatoes were warehoused
in general storage. The warehouseman sought to disclaim all liability for loss due to changes in temperature by stating that it would not
guarantee any specific temperature except on goods placed in cold
storage. There was no proof that the depositor knew that the goods
were going to be placed in general storage and the warehouseman
was held liable for damage caused by a change in temperature. Presumably, if the warehouseman had no cold storage place and the
customer had chosen general storage after full knowledge of the
risks, the result might have been different and in accord with the
Frolich case.
The Attorney General has approved stipulations in bills of
lading requiring proof of loss within a certain time6 and absolving
the carrier from liability after delivery on the ground at a nonstation or non-agent point of destination.70
66 Lardie v. Manistee & N.E.R.R., 192 Mich. 77, 158 N.W. 81 (1916) (alternative
holding).
67 Ginsberg v. Wabash Ry. Co., 219 Mich. 665, 189 N.W. 1018 (1922) (Federal Bills
of Lading Act liability, but court discusses Michigan rule).
68 266 Mich. 92, 253 N.W. 228 (1934).
69 [1914] MicH. ATr'Y GEN. REP. 489.
70 [1915] MICH. ATr'Y GEN. REP. 887.
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From this discussion it can be seen that certain stipulations
relieving the bailee from liability have been accorded approval in
this state despite the cited sections of the UWRA and UBLA. The
Code does not make any substantial changes in this area and its
provisions are in harmony with existing Michigan precedents. As
before, the warehouseman and carrier may not disclaim their obligations of care and delivery, but statements such as "said to contain" and "shipper's load and count" are permitted.71 Only in the
case of warehouse receipts must such language be conspicuous. 7 2
Both warehousemen and carriers may insert conditions pertaining
to the procedure and time limits for making claims78 and may limit
liability to a declared valuation if the depositor or shipper is given
the opportunity to secure full protection by declaring and paying
for a higher valuation.7 4 On the other hand, neither the warehouseman nor the carrier may disclaim liability for issuance of
documents of title by its agent without receipt of the goods if the
agent is actually or apparently authorized 7 5 nor may there be a
disclaimer of liability for conversion of the goods by the bailee. 6
The changed wording of the Code does not appear to contradict
the principles set forth in the Michigan decisions and opinions of
the Attorney General.
F. State Regulation
Reference has already been made to section 10-104, which
leaves in effect state regulatory statutes but states that violation
of them does not affect the status of a document of title under
article 7.77 An example of such regulation is found in the statutory
authority given the Liquor Control Commission to control the sale
or transfer of liquor warehouse receipts within Michigan.78 The
Commission has issued a regulation circumscribing permissible
dealings in such documents.7 9 The argument that violation of a
71 UNIrFoR

COMMERCIAL CODE

§§ 7-203, -301 (1).

72 UNEFOPM COMMERCIAL CODE 99

7-203, 1-201 (10); cf. § 7-301 (1).

7-204 (3), -309 (3).
§§ 7-204 (2), -309 (2).

78 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 99
74 UNIFORM COMMERCIL CODE

CODE §§ 7-102 (1) (g), -203, -301 (1).
CODE §§ 7-204 (2), -309 (2).
notes 14-17 supra.
436.32, .58 (1948), MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 18.1003, .1029 (1957).
79 MICH. ADM. CODE R 436.436 F (1954). See also [1935-1936] MicH. ATr'Y GEN.
75 UNIrFORm COMMER C L
76 UNIFORM CommMERcLL
77 See text accompanying
78 Mrcl. COMp. LAwS §§
BIENNAL

REP. 385.
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regulation such as this can prevent a purchaser from acquiring80tide
to property represented by documents is rejected by the Code.
G. Negotiable and Non-Negotiable Documents
Where the document of title permits delivery of goods to bearer
or to the order of a named person, the document is negotiable.,'
This represents no change in Michigan law82 except that the Code
would recognize the existence of a bill of lading payable to
"bearer." Such a document is not provided for by the present
statute.8 3
On the other hand, a substantial change is made by according
negotiability to a document where it is so treated in overseas trade
if it runs to a named person or assigns.8 4 Thus, in a limited area,
trade practices can confer negotiability upon a document of title
not otherwise possessing this attribute. "Overseas trade" is defined
in section 2-323 (3):
"A shipment by water or air or a contract contemplating
such shipment is 'overseas' insofar as by usage of trade or agreement it is subject to the commercial, financing or shipping
practices characteristic of international deep water commerce."
Absent federal enactment of the Code, this new provision would be
important only in the case of a bill of lading from a foreign point
of origin to a Michigan destination; outbound bills are covered
by the Federal Bills of Lading Act. Then, if the conflicts rules
already discussed were invoked, the Code would be applicable.Ys
All other documents of title are non-negotiable.8 6 The present
requirement that non-negotiable bills of lading and warehouse re87
ceipts be so marked is omitted.
80 Cf. Star Transfer Line v. General Exporting Co., 808 Mich. 86, 13 N.W.2d 217 (1944),
in which the Michigan Supreme Court refused to deny claimant's title to whiskey although
claimant allegedly had not complied with applicable federal and state regulations.
81 UNIFORM ComMERCLL CODE § 7-104 (1).
82 UNIFORM BILS OF LADING ACr §§ 2, 4, 5, 58 (1), MIcH. COMP. LAWs §§ 482.2, .4, .5,
.58 (1) (1948); MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 22.1122, .1124, .1125, .1178 (1)(1948); UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RcEnrs ACr §§ 2, 4, 5, 57, Mcir. CoIMP. LAws §§ 443.2, .4, .5, .57 (1958), MIcH.
STAT. ANN. §§ 19.422, .424, .425, .477 (1959); UNIFORM SALES Acr §§ 27, 76, MicH. Coiup.
LAws §§ 440.27, .76 (1948), MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.267, .816 (1959).
83 UNIFORM BiLus OF LADING ACr § 5, MIcH. Comp.LAws § 482.5 (1948), MficH. STAT.
ANN. § 22.1125 (1937).
84 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-104 (1) (b).
85 See text accompanying notes 19-28 supra.
86 UNIFORM CoMMERcIAL CODE § 7-104 (2).
87 UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING Acr § 8, MICH. Comp. LAws § 482.8 (1948), MicH. STAT.

ANN. § 22.1128 (1937); UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RCEIPrs Acr § 7, Mic. CoMP. LAws § 448.7
(1948), MicH. STAT. ANN. § 19.427 (1959).
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Since the question of the character of the instrument depends
upon the manner in which the document states the goods are deliverable, - for example, "to order of Smith," "to bearer," "to
Smith" - a further statement in a non-negotiable bill of lading "deliverable on proper indorsement and surrender of this receipt"
- will not make it negotiable. This language is to be regarded
only as insistence by the bailee on a certain type of receipt.18
III.

THE CONCEPT OF DUE NEGOTIATION

Title to goods in possession of a third person may be transferred
from seller to buyer through a normal sale of the goods. Documents of title, however, provide a more convenient means for
transferring title, permitting the parties to deal only with the
documents while leaving possession of the goods unchanged. Two
classes of documents, negotiable and non-negotiable, have been
developed. A purchaser of the first type may be in a position to
assert better title than his transferor. If he has purchased a negotiable document in the proper manner he can cut off some prior
rights to the goods and the document. The definition of a negotiable document has already discussed. In this section the concept
of good faith purchase, as applied to negotiable documents, is
examined. The following section compares the rights acquired
by purchase of both negotiable and non-negotiable documents.
A.

The FormalRequirements of Negotiation
The purchaser of a negotiable document of title acquires his
preferred position only if the document has been duly negotiated
to him. This requires that it be in such condition that it may
either be negotiated by delivery or by indorsement. Delivery of
the document will operate as a negotiation when no further
indorsements are required to pass title. Thus a document stating
that the goods will be delivered to "the order of bearer" or that
the goods will be delivered to "the order of X" and containing
X's indorsement in blank - for example, "X" or "deliver to bearer,
X" - may be negotiated by delivery. 9
These examples are not changed by the Code9" but a further
provision has been added to the effect that where a document
88 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 7-104 and comment.

89 UNIFORM SALES Acr § 28, MicH. Comp. LAws § 440.28 (1948), MiCn. STAT. ANN.
§ 19.268 (1959); UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS Aar § 37, MicH. CoMP. LAWS § 443.37
(1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19A57 (1959); UNIFORM B=LS OF LADING Acr § 28, MICH. Comp.
LAws § 482.28 (1948), Mi n. STAT. ANN. § 22.1148 (1937).
90 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-501 (1), (2).
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states that the goods will be delivered to the order of a named
person delivery of the document to him has the same effect as
negotiation.9 1
Under present law, where the document is not in one of the
conditions just mentioned, negotiation requires not only delivery
but the indorsement of the person entitled to the goods under the
document. Where there has been negotiation by indorsement to a
specific person, any further negotiation depends on his indorsement.92 The Code continues this without change s but, in the
last case mentioned, its definition of "holder" makes no mention
of the requirement of the indorsement of the special indorsee0 4
B.

The Concept of "Due Negotiation"

A second necessary element is the requirement of due negotiation. If the document can be negotiated by delivery or indorsement, the purchaser must also take it in good faith. Although
nowhere specifically defined in the current statutes, due negotiation means the payment of value in good faith and without notice
of any prior claims to the document or the goods. 95
The Code also uses the phrase "due negotiation," but the
import of those words is radically different. Thus it is stated:
"A negotiable document of title is 'duly negotiated' when
it is negotiated in the manner stated in this section to a holder
who purchases it in good faith without notice of any defense
against or claim to it on the part of any person and for value,
unless it is established that the negotiation is not in the regular course of business or financing or involves receiving the
document in settlement or payment of a money obligation."9' 6
91 UNIFORM COMMER C AL CoDx § 7-501 (2) (a). This does not mean that such a person
can claim better title than his transferor. There is still the requirement of due negotiation,
discussed in part Il-B infra.
92 UNIFORM SALFS Acr § 29, MxcH. COMP. LAws § 440.29 (1948), Mici. STAT. ANN.
§ 19.269 (1959); UNIFORM WAREHOUSE REcEIPTs Acr § 88, MICH. Comp. Lws § 443.58
(1948), MicH. STAT. ANN. § 19.458 (1959); UNIFORM BILLs OF LADING Acr § 29, Micii.
CoMP. LAws § 482.29 (1948), Micii. STAT. ANN. § 22.1149 (1937).
9

3 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 7-501 (1), (3).

94" 'Holder' means a person who is in possession of a document of title ... drawn,
issued or indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank." UNIFORM CoaMriIFcAL
CODE § 1-201 (20).
95 UNIFORM SALEs Aar §§ 32, 38, MicH. Comp. LAws § 440.32, .38 (1948), Mici. STAT.
ANN. §§ 19.272, .278 (1959); UNIFORM WAREHousE REcEnrs Acr §§ 41, 47, Micii. CoMP.
LAws §§ 445.41, A7 (1948), Micu. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.461, .467 (1959); UNIFORM BILlS OF
LADING Acr §§ 82, 38, Micii. Coan. LAws §§ 482.32, .38 (1948), Micu. STAT. ANN. §§ 22.1152,
.1158 (1937).
96 UNIFORM ComrmitcucAL CODE § 7-501 (4).
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The comment to this section indicates that "due negotiation"
will not exist where the person attempting to negotiate the document is one with whom it is not customary to deal in the trade. The
proponents of the Code state:
e.. .The foundation of the mercantile doctrine of good
faith purchase for value has always been . . .the furtherance and protection of the regular course of trade. The
reason for allowing a person, in bad faith or in error, to convey away rights which are not his own has from the beginning been to make possible the speedy handling of that great
run of commercial transactions which are patently usual and
normal.
*... No commercial purpose is served by allowing a
tramp or professor to 'duly negotiate' an order bill of lading
for hides or cotton not his own, and since such a transfer is
obviously not in the regular course of business, it is excluded
from the scope of the protection of subsection (4)."97
Similarly, if the transaction is not customary in the trade then
"due negotiation" does not exist.9 Protection is also denied where
the documents are taken in settlement of a money obligation. The
latter rule evidently embodies in the Code the conclusion of its
proponents that such a settlement cannot be commercially justified. If this is true, judicial consideration of possible changes in
commercial practice is foreclosed. 99
IV.

RIGHTS CONFERRED BY PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS

Inherent in the purchase of documents of title is the risk that
presentment of the document to the bailee will not result in
production of the goods or that the goods, if produced, will be subject to the claim of a third person. For instance, the document
might be forged or might be issued by a bailee who never received
the goods described. In many situations, where presentment of
the document is not followed by production of the goods, the
purchaser is given one or more causes of action based upon the
97 UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE § 7-501, comment 1.
98 UNIFORM COMMERCIL CODE § 7-501, comment 1.

99Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCLAL CODE § 1-102(2) (b). Note that § 7-501, comment 1,
indicates that a demand for documents as additional security can still fall within the
concept of "due negotiation" if the debtor is not then thought to be insolvent. The
distinction is thus drawn between the immediate satisfaction of a money obligation by
payment in documents and the deferred satisfaction of such an obligation through realization of documents held as collateral.
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terms of the document. The discussion which follows considers
both title to the goods and possible rights of the purchaser who
cannot secure a paramount title.
The possibilities of loss vary with the classification of the
purchaser. If the purchase has been in good faith, for value and
without notice of any prior claims, both under the Code and at
present, three classes of purchasers may exist: the purchaser claiming due negotiation, the purchaser of a non-negotiable document,
and the purchaser of a negotiable document who cannot assert due
negotiation. This third class is quite unusual.
At present under the uniform acts adopted in Michigan, the
purchaser of a negotiable document of title which lacks a necessary indorsement is regarded as a transferee. 00 He may become a
holder of the document by securing the missing indorsement. If
the missing indorsement is that of his transferor, he is given a right
to compel the indorsement but he acquires the better status of a
holder through due negotiation only as of the time the indorsement
is secured.1 01 Intervening notice of a prior claim will impair his
02
rights.'
Under the Code, in this situation, the purchaser is given the
right to compel his transferor's indorsement and his right is expanded in two respects. First, he need not, as at present, have paid
value. Regardless of the consideration given he may compel the
indorsement although lack of consideration would prevent him
from claiming due negotiation. Second, the right to compel indorsement includes the right to demand that his transferor secure
indorsements of other necessary parties. If the missing indorsements are supplied, the purchaser can claim due negotiation
thereafter. 03
The Code would create one new situation. In the case of
missing indorsements it is possible that the purchaser will acquire
them and still not be able to claim due negotiation because due
negotiation requires not only that the purchase be in good faith,
100 UNIFORM SALES Aar §§ 31, 34, MiCm. COMP. LAws §§ 440.31, .34 (1948), MICH.
STAT. ANN. §8 19.271, .274 (1959); UNIFORM WAREHOUSE REc m Acr §§ 89, 42, McIm.
COMP. LAWS §§ 443.39, .42 (1948), MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.459, .462 (1959); UNIFORM BILIS
OF LADING Acr §§ 30, 3, MiCH. COMP. LAWs §§ 482.80, .33 (1948), MiCH. STAT. ANN.

§§ 22.1150, .1153 (1937).

101 UNIFORM SAT.S Acr § 835, Mimi. CoMP. LAws § 440.35 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN.
(1959); UNIFORM WARehOusE REcEIPTS AcT § 43, Micit. COMP. LAWS j 443.43
(1948), MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 19.463 (1959); UNIFORM BiuS OF LADING Acr § 34, MICH.
COMP. LAws § 482.34 (1948), MicH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1154 (1937).
102 Hale & Co. v. Beley Cotton Co., 154 Tenn. 689, 290 S.W. 994 (1926).

§ 19.275

103 UNIFORM COMMECIL

CODE

§ 7-506.
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which is defined as honesty in fact, 1 4 but also requires that it be
in the regular course of business or financing and not in the settlement of a money obligation."0 5 Thus where the purchaser secures
the missing indorsements in good faith but his acquisition of the
document was for the purpose of settling a money obligation, he
cannot claim due negotiation, a result not currently possible. In
examining the risks of purchase under article 7 it is important to
distinguish between the three possible classes of purchasers in good
faith.
A. Lack of Title to the Goods or the Documents
There is always the possibility that the person depositing goods
with a bailee or negotiating documents may be doing so against
the wishes of the owner of the goods. Under the Code the person
to whom documents have been duly negotiated acquires title to
the goods and the documents0 6 unless the owner neither
"(a) delivered or entrusted them or any document of title
covering them to the bailor or his nominee with actual or
apparent authority to ship, store or sell or with power to
obtain delivery under this Article (Section 7-403) or with
power of disposition under this Act (Sections 2-403 and
9-307) or other statute or rule of law; nor
"(b) acquiesced in the procurement
by the bailor, or his
10 7
nominee of any document of title."'
This language is substantially different from that of the present
Michigan statutes which simply state that the holder by due negotiation acquires the title which his transferor had or had the
ability to convey.' 08 The Official Comments indicate that it is
intended to give the holder through due negotiation broad protection. 0 9 Expansion of the purchaser's rights is the result not
104 UNIFORM COMMERCIL CODE
105 UNIFORM
106 UNIFORM
107 UNIFORM
108 UNIFORM

§ 19.273 (1959);

§ 1-201 (19).

COMERCIAL CODE § 7-501 (4).
COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-502 (1).
COIsMM-RCIAL CODE § 7-503 (1).
SALES ACr § 33, MicH. COMP. LAWs § 440.33 (1948), AICH. STAT. ANN.
UNIFORM WAREHOUSE REcErs Acr § 41, fic. COMP. LAvs § 443.41

(1948), Mic. STAT. ANN. § 19.461 (1959); UNiFoRm BILLS OF LADING Acr § 32, MICH.
Coue. LAws § 482.32 (1948), MIIcH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1152 (1937).
100 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-503, comment 1 states, in part:
"In general it may be said that the title of a purchaser by due negotiation prevails
over almost any interest in the goods which existed prior to the procurement of the
document of title if the possession of the goods by the person obtaining the document
derived from any action by the prior claimant which introduced the goods into the
stream of commerce or carried them along that stream. A thief of the goods cannot indeed
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only of the provisions of article 7, but also of the increased protection given to purchasers under the other Code sections noted
in the quotation. Thus under section 2-403 entrusting of goods
to a merchant who deals in similar goods gives him the power to
pass title to a buyer in the ordinary course of business11 0
Purchasers of non-negotiable documents or of negotiable documents without due negotiation receive only the title which their
transferor had or had actual authority to convey."' This is substantially less protection than is given a holder through due negotiation and is similar to the current Michigan rule. l 2 Although
the purchaser's position is not enhanced because he has purchased
goods through the medium of documents, he is not prevented
from relying upon other sections of the Code which would protect
him."13
by shipping or storing them to his own order acquire power to transfer them to a good
faith purchaser. Nor can a tenant or mortgagor defeat any rights of a landlord or
mortgagee which have been perfected under the local law merely by wrongfully shipping
or storing a portion of the crop or other goods. However, 'acquiescence' by the landlord
or tenant does not require active consent under subsection (1) (b) and knowledge of
the likelihood of storage or shipment with no objection or effort to control it is sufficient
to defeat his rights as against one who takes by 'due' negotiation of a negotiable document....
"Persons having an interest in goods also frequently deliver or entrust them to
agents or servants other than factors for the purpose of shipping or warehousing or under
circumstances reasonably contemplating such action. Rounding out the case law development under the prior Acts, this Act is clear that such persons assume full risk that the
agent to whom the goods are so delivered may ship or store in breach of duty, take a
document to his own order and then proceed to misappropriate it. This Act makes no
distinction between possession or mere custody in such situations and finds no exception
in the case of larceny by a bailee or the like. The safeguard in such situations lies in the
requirement that a due negotiation can occur only 'in the regular course of business or
financing' and that the purchase be in good faith and without notice. See section 7-501.
Documents of title have no market among the commercially inexperienced and the commercially experienced do not take them without inquiry from persons known to be truck
drivers or petty clerks even though such persons purport to be operating in their own
names."

110 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403 (2), (3). Sections 7-502 and 7-503 have been
the subject of much discussion. For further comments see BRAuCn,
DOCUMinZTS OF
TITLE 61-65 (1958); NEw YORK LAW REvisION COMM'N, STuDY or THE UNIFORM CoMM.EImAL
CoDE 1837-48 (1955).
111 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-504 (1).
112 UNIFORM SALEs Ac'r § 34, MiCH. CoMP. LAws § 440.34 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 19.274 (1959); UNIFORM WAREHoUSE REcEIPTs ACr § 42, MICH. CoMp. LAws § 443.42
(1948), Mien. STAT. ANN. § 19.462 (1959); UNIFORM Bais OF LADING Aar § 33, MICH. Colfp.
LAws § 482.33 (1948), MiCH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1153 (1937).
113 Assume that T entrusted goods to S who deposited them in a warehouse, received a
non-negotiable receipt for them, and sold the receipt to P. If S had no actual authority to
pass title, P acquires no rights in the goods by virtue of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 7-504(1), but he may still win if S had the power to pass title under § 2-403. Such a
result is indicated by the language of § 7-504, comment 1, which gives as an example
the payment by a consignee against a straight bill of lading.
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In the case where documents are negotiated by a person acquiring them by fraud, duress, theft, or similar means, the Code continues the rule that the fraudulent acquisition does not impair
114
the validity of the negotiation.
B.

DuplicateDocuments

Issuance by the bailee of two documents of title purporting to
call for delivery of the same goods, whether the bailee is acting
with fraudulent intent or not, is obviously a dangerous practice.
The UBLA and UWRA proscribe this practice unless the second
document is marked as a duplicate. 1 5 No attempt is made to state
specifically whether the second document can confer any right in
the goods.
The Code sections dealing with overissue are much more
detailed. Section 7-402 provides:
"Neither a duplicate nor any other document of title
purporting to cover goods already represented by an outstanding document of the same issuer confers any right in the
goods, except as provided in the case of bills in a set, overissue of documents for fungible goods and substitutes for
lost, stolen or destroyed documents. But the issuer is liable
for damages caused by his overissue or failure to identify a
duplicate document as such by conspicuous notation on its
face."
The liability imposed by this section is broader than under either
the UWRA or UBLA, which acts create a cause of action only in
favor of a purchaser for value of a negotiable document. 16
The first exception to this section pertains to bills of lading
issued in a set. The custom of carriers to issue bills in a set seems
to have arisen because of the fear that one bill of lading con114 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-502 (2). Cf. UNIFORM SALES Aar § 38, MICH. CoMP.
LAws § 440.38 (1948), MicH. STAT. ANN. § 19.278 (1959); UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEnPTs
ACr § 47, MIcI. CoMP. LAws § 443.47 (1948), MxcH. STAT. ANN. § 19.467 (1959); UNIFORM
BLLS OF LADING Acr § 38, Mica. Comrp. LAws § 482.38 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1158

(1937).
115 UNIFORM BIuLs OF LADING ACT § 7, MicH. ComP. LAws § 482.7 (1948), MicH.STAT.
ANN. § 22.1127 (1937); UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEImS ACT § 6, MIcH. CmP. LAWS § 443.6
(1948), MicH. STAT. ANN. § 19.426 (1959).
116 See the statutes cited in note 114 supra. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-402,
comment 2, notes that this section creates a cause of action against the issuer even if the
purchaser's transferor knew that the document was overissued. Thus the purchaser
would acquire more than his transferor when purchasing a non-negotiable document.
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trolling disposition of the goods might be lost in transit. 117 Since

each part purports to control the goods, there is a possibility that
two parts may be separately negotiated to different persons. The
UBLA prohibits issuance of negotiable bills in a set in any place
on the North American continent except Alaska and makes the
carrier liable for improper issuance to a purchaser for value." 8
The Code, rephrasing the prohibition, extends it to non-negotiable
documents and prohibits issuance except where customary in
overseas transportation." 9 The Code adds a statement concerning
the effect on title to the goods of a lawfully issued negotiable set.
The person to whom the first due negotiation is made acquires title
to the goods, but the carrier is protected if it delivers in good faith
against any part of the set. Suppose that separate parts of a negotiable bill in a set are duly negotiated to both X and Y, the negotiation to X being prior in time. X has title to the goods 20 and Y

has a cause of action against his transferor.' 2 ' If Y should secure
delivery of the goods from the carrier who has no notice of X's
superior claim, then X has no cause of action against the carrier
22
but may sue Y for the goods.
The special treatment accorded fungible goods constitutes the
second exception to the general rule of invalidity of overissued
documents. Assume that X and Y deposit fungible goods with B,
a warehouseman. B commingles the goods. Under the UWRA, B
is permitted to commingle fungible goods only when authorized
by agreement or custom. All other goods must be kept separate. 2 3
The Code would change this by permitting commingling at any
time if the goods are fungible. Other goods may be commingled
if the receipt so provides. 24 Both X and Y take the risk that a
117 Another reason would be to provide several people with documents controlling the
same goods. See 2 WILLISTON, SALES § 441 (1948), for a criticism of this practice.
118 UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING ACr § 6, MICH. CoMP. LAws § 482.6 (1948), MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 22.1126 (1937).
119 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-304 (1).
120 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-304 (3).
121 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-304 (4).
122 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-304 (3), (5). There is no specific provision determining title to goods for which non-negotiable bills in a set have been issued, but the
result would be governed by §§ 7-504 (1), (2) (b). The first purchaser (X) would be protected unless the second purchaser (Y) was a buyer in the ordinary course of business from
the transferor who either first notified the carrier or obtained delivery of the goods.
123 UNIFORM WAREnOusE REcEIPTs ACT §§ 22, 23, MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 443.22, .23
(1948), MiCH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.442, .443 (1959). See also MiCH. CoMP. LAws § 285.73
(1948), MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 12.119 (13) (1958) (commingling of fungible farm produce).
24
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-207 (1).

DOCUMENTS

OF TITLE

733

shortage may develop. The Code follows present law in regarding
them as tenants in common who must share the loss equally.125
But there is the chance that subsequently the warehouseman may
issue a receipt to Z for fungible goods which have not been received. The Code specifically provides that if Z duly negotiates
the receipt to A then A shares as a tenant in common with X and
y.126 This is one case in which the status of a purchaser through
due negotiation (A) is much better than a person who purchases
a negotiable document without due negotiation. The latter would
not be entitled to share as a tenant in common with X and Y.
The last exception relates to substitute documents. If a document allegedly is lost, stolen, or destroyed, disposition of the goods
must be made without the assurance that the person receiving the
goods is actually entitled to them. There is always the possibility
that the missing document may turn up in the hands of another
claimant. The interests of the bailee, the person claiming under
the missing document, and the person who may possibly present
the missing document at a later date must be reconciled. The Code
provides that in the case of a lost, missing, or stolen document a
court may order delivery of the goods or the issuance of a substitute
document. Protection for a person later presenting the missing
document is obtained by requiring the posting of a bond before
the duplicate is issued. Posting of a bond is mandatory if a substitute for a negotiable document is requested and within the dis127
cretion of the court if the missing document is non-negotiable.
This Code provision is broader than those provided in the present
statutes which do not authorize this procedure in the case of either
a stolen negotiable or any non-negotiable document.1 28 The bailee
is not compelled to seek a court order. He may deliver pursuant to
the terms of the missing document, an act of doubtful validity at
present 1 29 but he risks being held for improper delivery. He will
not be liable for conversion if the delivery was made in good
faith.1 30
125 UNIFORM WVAREHOUSE RrEcssrs ACT § 23, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 443.23

(1948), Mimc.

STAT. ANN. § 19.443 (1959); cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-207 (2).
120 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-207 (2). For further discussion see BRAUCHEFR,
DOCUMENTS OF TITLE 98-102 (1958).
127 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-601 (1).

128 UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RE CEnTS ACT § 14, MICH. Comp. LAws § 443.14 (1948), MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 19.434 (1959); UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING ACT § 17, MICH. COMp. LAWs §
482.17 (1948), Nfxcu. STAT. ANN. § 22.1137 (1937).
129 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-601 (2), and comment 1.
130 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-601 (2).
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C. Disposition of the Goods by the Bailee
In the case of the deposit of fungible goods by X and Y with
B, a warehouseman, there is a further risk that a shortage may
develop, not because of overissue of receipts, but because the warehouseman sells some of the fungible goods directly to A. Under the
UWRA it could be argued that X and Y retained title to the goods
sold and could recover them from A.' 3 ' However, the Code adopts
the position that A should be protected if he is a buyer in the ordinary course of business from B and B is in the business of dealing
in such fungible goods for his own account.' 32 This is consistent
with the position taken in article 2 that entrusting of goods to a
merchant dealing in them gives the merchant power to pass title to
1 33
a buyer in the ordinary course of business.

A related situation occurs when P purchases a non-negotiable
document from S. If B, the bailee, in good faith disposes of the
goods upon the instructions of S,then P loses his right to demand
delivery from B.134 Here the risk is that P will not be able to hold

the bailee liable for non-receipt although he may still be able to
35
claim the goods from S.'
D. Alteration or Unauthorized Completion
Currently, the purchaser of a document of tide assumes the risk
that the original terms of the document have been altered or that
it was issued with one or more terms left blank and these terms
were subsequently completed without authority from the issuer.
In such a case a purchaser for value may enforce the document
only according to its original terms.' 6 This rule as to bills of
lading is unchanged by the Code, but as to warehouse receipts it
is provided that "a purchaser for value and without notice of the
want of authority may treat the insertion as authorized. 137 An
§

7-205, comment.
131 UNIFORM COMMERCAL CODE
132 UNIFORM COMMERCtAL CODE § 7-205. Such a buyer is defined in § 1-201 (9).
133 UNIFORM CoiMERmCAL CODE § 2-403 (2). What result if the goods are not fungible?
From the language of § 2-403 (2) alone it would seem applicable to both fungible and nonfungible goods, but under § 7-502 (1) the person to whom a document has been duly
negotiated gets title to the goods subject only to a few exceptions, none of which refer to
§ 2-403.
134 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-504 (2) (c).
'35 If S has disposed of the goods, A can be barred from asserting his title against S's

vendee if § 7-504 (2) (b) is applicable. See part IV-G infra.

136 UNIFORM WAREnOUSE REcEi'rs Acr § 13, Micr.CoMP. LAWS § 443.13 (1948), Micn.
STAT. ANN. § 19.433 (1959); UNIFORM BILLs OF LADING ACr § 16, MicH. COMP. LAws §
482.16 (1948), MiCH.STAT. ANN. § 22.1136 (1937).
137 UNIFORM COMMERcIAL CODE § 7-306.
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alteration other than such insertion leaves the receipt enforceable
1 38
as originally issued.
The Official Comment states: "The execution of warehouse
receipts in blank is a dangerous practice. As between the issuer and
an innocent purchaser the risks should clearly fall on the former."'139
This comment is most interesting when it is noted that there is no
40
parallel treatment of bills of lading. One writer has suggested
that the different treatment is in accordance with commercial practice. Thus warehouse receipts are prepared by the bailee's agent
when he actually receives the goods but bills of lading are made
out by the shipper and his description of the goods is accepted as
correct, giving rise to the term "shipper's load and count." This
ignores the difference between the placing of the carrier's signature
on a bill for goods already loaded, with a disclaimer of liability for
the accuracy of the description, and placing the same signature
on a blank bill of lading. The invitation for fraud may prove irresistable in the latter case since it permits sale of the document
141
without the bother of loading anything aboard the carrier.
The treatment of unauthorized completions is disappointing
because it is limited to warehouse receipts and bills of lading.
Suppose that a delivery order is issued with some blanks and is
purchased before acceptance by the bailee. The Code does not
say whether the issuer is under an obligation to obtain acceptance
of the delivery order by the bailee in accordance with the unauthor42

ized insertion.1

E. FreightForwarderBills of Lading
D may deliver a small lot of goods to F, a transportation company, for the purpose of shipment. He does this because F is a
freight forwarder who assembles small shipments into carload lots
and thus secures the lower rate allowed such shipments. 43 F issues
138 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-208.
139 UNIFORM COIfMERCIAL CODE § 7-208, comment 1.
140 Patton, Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading, and Other Documents of Title: A

Comparison of the Texas Law and Article Seven of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31
TEXAs L. REV. 167, 189 (1952).
141 Under the Federal Bills of Lading Act a carrier was held liable where the shipper
procured a blank bill of lading before it had loaded the car, and then used the bill to
defraud a third person. Since the car had never been loaded with anything, the words
"shipper's load and count" would not protect the carrier. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Stephens
Nat. Bank, 75 F.2d 398 (8th Cir. 1935). See also Bailey, Bills of Lading Under Texas Law,
17 TxAs L. REV. 422, 422-31 (1939).
142 Cf. UNIFORM CO-MMERCIAL CODE § 7-502 (1) (d).
143 See BRAUcHER, DOCUMENTS OF TrrLE 13-14 (1958); 4 CALLAGHAN'S MICHIGAN CIVIL
JURISPRUDENCE

291-93 (1958).
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to D a negotiable bill of lading and in turn receives a negotiable
bill of lading covering many lots, including D's from 0, the carrier.
What happens if F and D duly negotiate the bills of lading to separate parties? In such a case, the purchaser from D acquires title
to D's goods 44 on the theory that the bill of lading issued by 0 to F
will indicate on its face that it is subject to a freight forwarder
bill.1 45 However, 0 is protected if it delivers in accordance with
the terms of its own bill.1 4 6 There is no comparable Michigan

statute.
F. Rights of Transferor's Creditors
The transferee of a non-negotiable document runs the risk that
creditors of the transferor may be successful in reaching the goods
in the hands of the bailee.147 Under current Michigan law any

creditor of the transferor may defeat the transferee's title by attachment or execution until such time as the transferee notifies
the bailee of the transfer.

48

The Code would restrict this right to

only those creditors who could attack the transfer as being fraudulent under the terms of section 2-402.149
44

1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
145 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
146 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

7-503 (3).
7-503, comment 3.

§ 7-503 (3).

3.47 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-504 (2) (a).
148 UNIFORM SALES Aar § 34, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 440.34 (1948), MXCH. STAT. ANN. §
19.274 (1959); UNIFORM WAP.ssousE REcum'rs ACr § 42, MICH. CoMP. LAws § 443.42 (1948),
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.462 (1959); UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING Acr § 33, MICH. COmP. LAws

§ 482.33 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1153 (1937). Cf. UNIFORM SALES Aar § 26, MICH.
COMp.
LAws § 440.26 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.266 (1959).
149
UNIFOIM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-402 does not set forth the classes of creditors entitled to treat the sale as void but refers to state law outside the Code. An analysis of any
possible change in Michigan law under this particular section is not within the scope of
this article. However, it should be noted that by statute in Michigan retention of possession by the seller is fraudulent as to all creditors unless the transferee can prove good
faith and no intent to defraud. Certain exceptions are made where a bill of sale is filed
or where title to the chattel is registered. MicH. Comp. LAws § 556.137 (1948), MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 26.926 (1953). For a further discussion of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
2-402, see BRAucHER, DocumENTs oF TrrLu 73-75 (1958); HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES
107-08 (1958).
The rights of creditors under § 2-402 should be distinguished from claims of secured
creditors of the seller. Assume that S is the owner of goods for which documents of title
have been issued. He borrows money from C and purports to give C a security interest
in the goods represented by the documents. He then sells the documents to P. C's
rights are governed by Article 9 on secured transactions. Where the goods are represented
by negotiable documents C is required to perfect his security interest in the documents
themselves, § 9-304 (2). This may be done by filing, § 9-304 (1), (2), or by taking possession of the document, § 9-305. The latter course is the only safe one since if P takes
through due negotiation, § 9-309 subordinates C's interest to that of P. However, if P
purchases a negotiable document but without due negotiation, as in the case of settlement
of a money obligation, the Code appears to subordinate P's interest to that of C. See §§
7-504(1), 9-201,-309. The purchaser of a non-negotiable document takes subject to the
perfected claim of a creditor §§ 7-504(1), 9-201. C may perfect his claim by filing,
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G. Second Sale by the Transferor
The rights of the transferee of a non-negotiable document also
may be defeated by a second sale of the goods by the transferor.
Currently, if P purchases a non-negotiable document of title from
S and then S sells the goods represented by the document to T, T
secures title to the goods if he first notifies the bailee.150 This is a
specialized version of the rule that a seller retaining possession
may pass title to a second bona fide purchaser but in the case of
documents the second purchaser can perfect his claims by notificaand taking detion of the bailee rather than by paying value
52
livery.151 The Code continues this principle.
However, under the Code, not every second sale to T will
defeat P's title. Protection is given to T, at P's expense, only if
T is a buyer in the ordinary course of business from S. T will not
be protected if he is a bulk buyer or takes the goods as security for,
or in satisfaction of, a money obligation. 15 3 Thus, P's protection
is increased in this case but mainly because of concepts not peculiar
to article 7.
H. Diversion and Reconsignment: Stoppage in Transit
There are certain hazards for purchasers peculiar to bills of
lading. It is possible that where goods are in transit under a straight
bill of lading the consignor may decide that he wishes to ship them
to a person other than the original consignee. The question then
arises whether a purchaser of the non-negotiable bill from the
consignee can assert a property right in the goods superior to that
notifying the bailee, or securing issuance of documents in his name. § 9-304(3). If we
assume that P in our example has purchased non-negotiable documents, and that C has
filed, P will still prevail over C if he is a buyer in the ordinary course of business from S,
except in the case of farm products purchased from a person engaged in farming operations. This is true although P knows of the existence of the security interest if he believes that the sale is not in violation of the security agreement. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 9-307 (1), and comment. One further point: if P is other than a buyer in the
ordinary course of business and C's security interest is not perfected immediately, P will
prevail only to the extent that he both gives value and receives delivery of the documents
without notice of C's claim and prior to perfection. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

9-501 (1) (c).
150 UNIFORM SALES ACr § 34, MxCH. Comp. LAws § 440.34 (1948), MIcH. STAT. ANN. §
19.274 (1959); UNIFORM WAREHousE RPEcxIs Acr § 42, MiCH. Comp. LAws § 443.42 (1948),
Mxcx. STAT. ANN. § 19.462 (1959); UNIFORM BIrs OF LADING Aar § 33, MiCH. Comp. LAws
§ 482.33 (1948), MxcHi. STAT. ANN. § 22.1153 (1937).
E

151 Cf. UNIFORM SAL s Acr § 25, MicmoCoMp. LAws § 440.25 (1948), MxcH. STAT. ANN.

§ 19.265 (1959).

152 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-504 (2) (b).
153 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-201 (9), 7-504(2) (b).
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of the person actually receiving them. There are no Michigan
cases or statutes covering this point. Presumably the issue would
be determined by whether title had passed to the consignee at
the time of diversion.1' 4 The Code does not spell out the result
in all cases, but where the substituted consignee is a buyer in the
ordinary course of business from the consignor, he takes free of
any claim by the original consignee.?55 This danger is limited to
the purchase of non-negotiable bills since only the holder of a
negotiable bill may divert. 56
The second possible hazard is the seller's exercise of his right of
stoppage in transit. What happens when buyer sells goods in
transit to sub-buyer and then seller attempts to exercise his right
to stop the goods? In the case of negotiable bills of lading, subbuyer can protect himself by obtaining the bill since negotiation
of the bill to buyer by seller terminate's seller's right to stop. 16
The result in the case of non-negotiable bills of lading is not
quite so clear. If the seller has agreed to ship directly to sub-buyer
he apparently loses his right to stop upon buyer's insolvency.',,

However, where shipment is made directly to buyer who then
diverts to sub-buyer, seller's right to stop seems to exist until receipt of the goods by sub-buyer. 59
I.

Title Based on Unaccepted Delivery Orders

Suppose that A, the owner of certain goods, deposits them with
a bailee and receives a document of title. He then issues an order
to deliver the goods and sells this order to Y. The document issued

by A is a delivery order and is a document of title under both the
Code 60 and the Uniform Sales Act. 6 ' However, the present USA
sections on negotiation and transfer of documents of title apply
154 Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-504, comment; Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Peters,
White & Co., 238 N.Y. 97, 134 N.E. 849 (1922).
155 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-504 (3).
156 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-303 (1) (a).
157 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-705 (2) (d).
158 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-705, comment 2.
159 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-705 (2) (a), and comment 2. The seller's right of
stoppage is also defeated by reshipment by the carrier on the buyer's instruction, §
2-705 (2) (c), but comment 3 to this section indicates that diversion at the order of the
buyer is not reshipment if it is an incident to the original contract of carriage. UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-705 is a revision of UNIFORM SALES Acr §§ 57-59, MICH. CoMP. LAWS
§§ 440.57-.60 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.297-.300 (1959). See also UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEIrs
Acr §§ 9, 11, 49, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 443.9, .11, .49 (1948), MicH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 19.429, .431, .469 (1959). For further comment, see BRAuenER, DocuMENTs OF TrILE
78-80 (1958); HAWKLAND, SALES AND BuLK SALES 146-94 (1958).

160 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201 (15).

SALES Aar § 76 (1), MICmH. Comp. LAWS § 440.76 (1)
19.316 (1) (1959).

161 UNIFORM
ANN. §

(1948), MICH. STAT.
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only after the delivery order has been accepted by the bailee. 162
An innovation in the Code is the attempt to specify the title consequences of dealings in unaccepted delivery orders.
Possible problems when dealing with unaccepted delivery orders can be divided into three general categories: (1) Where A
issues a delivery order covering goods for which there already is a
document outstanding as in the case above, (2) where A issues
two delivery orders covering the same goods, and (3) where X a
stranger to A's title issues a delivery order.
Case 1 is not a case of overissue covered by section 7-402 since
the two documents outstanding are not those of the same issuer.1 3
The Code, however, specifically provides that title based upon an
unaccepted delivery order, whether it is negotiable or not, is subject to the rights of any person to whom a negotiable warehouse
receipt or bill of lading has been duly negotiated.' 64 If the receipt
or bill of lading outstanding is not negotiable or is not duly
negotiated, the person acquiring it, if a buyer in the ordinary
course of business from A, may still defeat Y's rights by first notifying the bailee or receiving the goods. 16 5
Case 2 is a case of overissue and the general rule of invalidity
of the second document apparently applies. 66 But again the rights
under the first delivery order, although it is negotiable, can be defeated in the same manner as those under a non-negotiable docu-

ment. 16

7

If, as in case 3, the delivery order is issued and sold by a person
having no rights in the goods, and if it is negotiable, the purchaser
will not receive good title unless the other claimant acquiesced
in its procurement. 6 If it is non-negotiable, the purchaser will
take nothing.'69
V.

LIABILITIES INCURRED BY NEGOTIATION OR TRANSFER
OF DOCUMENTS

Section 7-505 provides that the indorsement of a document of
162 A negotiable document of title under the Uniform Sales Act is one in which
it is stated that the goods will be delivered to bearer. An unaccepted delivery order
would not contain this statement. See UNFORM SALES Acr § 27, MICH. ComP. LAws §
440.27 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.267 (1959).
163 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-402, comment 3.
104 UNIFOUE COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-503(2).
103 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 7-503(2), -504(2) (b).
166 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-402. The specialized treatment of overissue in

the case of fungible goods contained in § 7-207 (2) will not apply because the warehouseman has not issued any documents.
167 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-504(2).
168 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-503 (1).
109UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-504(1).
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title does not make the indorser liable for the default of either the
bailee or any previous indorsers. This is in accord with present
Michigan law.'7 0 However, if the document is a negotiable delivery order which is duly negotiated, the issuer and any indorsers
have the obligation to procure the bailee's acceptance.' 71 This
latter provision is new. As noted earlier, the transferee of a negotiable document has a right7 2 to compel his transferor to secure
any necessary indorsements.
In the case of delivery orders the Code makes it clear that the
the holder through due negotiation does not acquire the obligation
of the bailee to deliver until after acceptance of the document.
Does acceptance by a bailee of a delivery order have any effect on
the obligations of the issuer? Suppose that a delivery order is
issued by A to B directing warehouseman, W, to deliver nonexistent goods to the order of B. B then duly negotiates the unaccepted delivery order to C who presents it to W for acceptance.
If W refuses to accept or deliver, A is liable to C for damages caused
by non-receipt of the goods under section 7-203 because A is the
issuer of an unaccepted delivery order.

73

But what happens if

W accepts? It is clear that W will be liable for non-receipt, but
will A? Since section 7-203 imposes liability upon only the issuer
and since the implication of the definition of issuer is that A falls
within its terms only while the delivery order is unaccepted it would
seem that A is no longer liable for non-receipt. A more logical
possibility is that the liability for non-receipt imposed upon A in
favor of C is not destroyed upon subsequent acceptance by W but
that if C duly negotiated to D after acceptance, D would be able
to hold only W liable for non-receipt, since A is an issuer as to C
but not as to D.
Where a document of title is sold the seller gives certain warranties. Under the present uniform acts they are that the document is genuine, that the seller has a legal right to sell the document, and that the seller has no knowledge of facts impairing its
validity. In addition the seller also warrants title to the goods,
170 UNIFORM SAiLs ACT § 37, MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 440.37 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. §
AC § 45, MxcH. COMP. LAWs § 443.45 (1948),
19.277 (1959); UNIFoRM WAREHOUSE RwI
OF LADING Acr § 36, MicH. CoMp. LAws
MicHI.STAT. ANN. § 19.465 (1959); UNIFORM Bis
§ 482.36 (1948), MicH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1156 (1937). In Maybee v. Tregent, 47 Mich. 495,
11 N.W. 287 (1882), a case antedating adoption of the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, suit
was brought against the seller of goods for non-delivery on the theory that by indorsing the
bill of lading the seller became liable on the document. The court rejected this theory,
but noted that plaintiff could still sue for breach of the underlying contract.
171 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-502 (1) (d).
17 2
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-506. See part IV supra.
173 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-102 (1) (g).
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merchantable quality, and fitness for a special purpose where such
warranties would be implied if the goods were sold without use of
the documents. 174 The Code continues the warranties as to the
documents but omits specific provision for the implied sales warranties on the theory that those warranties will exist in any case
since they are derived from the underlying contract of sale. 175
Under the present statutes there is a question whether these
warranties of the seller concerning the documents extend to remote
purchasers.17 The Code removes this question by stating that
unless otherwise agreed the given warranties run only to the imme77

diate purchaser.1

It often happens that a seller will ship goods to a buyer and then
forward through a bank, or other agent for collection, the bills of lading and a draft drawn on the buyer. When buyer pays or accepts the
draft he will be given the bills of lading. By the use of an appropriate form of a bill of lading seller will thus be able to retain a
security interest in the goods until paid.17s Sometimes the bank

will advance seller funds when it takes the draft for collection.
The Code follows present law in stating that the collecting bank
does not assume warranty liability to the buyer when presenting
the draft for collection. The Code appears to change present law
by stating affirmatively that the intermediary warrants its own
good faith and authority. 1 79 However, the Code does not foreclose
warranty liability for the bank or other intermediary if it is acting
180
as agent for the seller or has assumed the seller's obligations.
An interesting Michigan decision in this area is Wettlaufer
Mfg. Corp. v. DetroitBank. 81 ' Plaintiff was a customer at defend-

ant bank and, wishing to purchase some steel, arranged for presentment to his bank of a draft drawn on him with a bill of lading
174 UNIFORM SALES Acr § 36, ?vIcH. COMP. LAws § 440.36 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. §

19.276 (1959); UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEInTS ACT § 44, MICH. CoiF. LAWS § 443.44 (1948),
M'icH. STAT. ANN. § 19.464 (1959); UNIFORM Bums OF LADING Acr § 35, AicH. Comp. LAws
§ 482.35 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1155 (1937).
175 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-507, comment 1.
176 In the statutes cited in note 174 supra there is no mention of who may enforce
the warranties.
177 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE § 7-507. Under this section the parties may also agree
that there are to be no warranties. The treatment of warranties as to documents of
title is somewhat different from that accorded those accompanying negotiable instruments.

In the latter case use of the indorsement "without recourse" is restricted, § 3-417 (3), and
warranties extend to subsequent holders in good faith under § 3-417 (2).
178 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-505.
179 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-508. Cf. UNIFORM B1Ss OF LADING ACT § 37, MICH.
COMP. LAws § 482.37 (1948), MicH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1157 (1937); UNIFORM WAREHOUSE
REc_.prs Acr § 46, MicH. CoMP. LAws § 443.46 (1948), fIcii. STAT. ANN. § 19.466 (1959).
180 See 2 WYLLISTON, SALES § 435 (1948).
181 324 Mich. 684, 37 N.W.2d 674 (1949).
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attached. When the bill of lading and draft arrived, defendant's
teller telephoned this fact to plaintiff and also stated that the documents were straight bills of lading showing that a certain amount
of steel had been shipped. Plaintiff then authorized a charge
against his account in the amount of the draft. Upon subsequent
examination of the bills, plaintiff discovered that they were not
signed by any carrier and were in fact fraudulent. The Michigan
Supreme Court held that the teller's statement was a material misrepresentation of fact giving plaintiff a cause of action for fraud.
The result in this case would not be different under the Code because plaintiff's theory was not based upon the existence of any war18 2

ranty.

VI.

THE BAILEE'S DUTY OF CARE

A.

Carriers

Section 7-309 (1) defines the duty of care imposed upon a carrier.
"A carrier who issues a bill of lading whether negotiable
or non-negotiable must exercise the degree of care in relation to the goods which a reasonably careful man would
exercise under like circumstances. This subsection does not
repeal or change any law or rule of law which imposes liability
upon a common carrier for damages not caused by its negligence."
This section is a revision of section 3 of the UBLA 183 and leaves
in force present Michigan statutes and decisions defining the liability of a common carrier. The extent of this liability is explored
elsewhere' 84 and need not be detailed here except to note that by
statute the carrier is made liable for loss caused by agencies beyond its control where the negligence of the carrier contributes to
the loss.185 The balance of section 7-309 permits the carrier to
limit the time for making claims and limit its liability if the actual
value of the goods is not declared.18 6
182Liabilities involved in presentment of documents for payment under letters of
credit should also be noted. See UNrFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 5-111, -114.
183 MICH. COMP. LAWs § 482.3 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1123 (1937).
184 See 4 CALLAGHAN'S MIcHIGAN CIVIL JURISPRUDENCE 233-73 (1958).
185 MICH. Coap. LAws § 469.501 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1191 (1937). Cf.
Ithaca Roller Mills v. Ann Arbor R.R., 217 Mich. 348, 186 N.W. 516 (1922) (applying
federal law).
186 For a discussion of the validity of such limitations and the changes the Code
would make in present Michigan law, see part II-E supra.
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The Code also establishes liability of originating and connecting carriers when a through bill of lading is issued. If there is a
breach of duty on the part of any carrier, the originating carrier
is liable and the connecting carrier is liable for a breach of duty
while the goods are in its possession. When the originating carrier
is held liable for the default of a connecting carrier it is given a
right over against the ultimate wrongdoer.' 87 The comment states
that this section imposes no obligation to issue a through bill of
lading. 8
Although there is no prior uniform statutory treatment of this
subject, there is a Michigan statute which imposes liability upon
the originating carrier for loss caused by connecting carriers. The
originating carrier is also given a right over against the connecting
carrier.8 9
B.

Warehousemen

Section 7-204 (1) of the Code provides:
"A warehouseman is liable for damages for loss of or injury to the goods caused by his failure to exercise such care
in regard to them as a reasonably careful man would exercise
under like circumstances but unless otherwise agreed he is not
liable for damages which could not have been avoided by the
exercise of such care."' 190
This is a revision of section 21 of the UWRA191 and would not
change existing Michigan law.' 9 2 As in the case of bills of lading,
certain limitations of liability are permitted. 93
The Code does not attempt to state when the carrier's liability
as a common carrier ceases and becomes that of a warehouseman.
The Michigan Supreme Court has stated that the carrier is held to
a warehouseman's standard of care only after it has given notice
187

UIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

7-302.

188 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-302, comment 1.
189 Mici. CoMP. LAws § 462.7 (e) (1948), Micr. STAT.
A90 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

7-204 (1).

ANN.

§ 22.26(e) (1937).

191 MicH. Comsp. LAWS § 443.21 (1948), MlcI. STAT. ANN. § 19.441 (1959). See also
MicH. CoMp. LAws § 444.25 (1948), MicH. STAT. ANN. § 19.515 (1959).
192 Berry v. Cadillac Storage Co., 259 Mich. 104, 242 N.W. 855 (1932); Purse v. Detroit
Harbor Terminals, Inc., 266 Mich. 92, 253 N.W. 228 (1934) (reasonable care dependent
on nature of goods and weather conditions); Price & Pierce, Ltd. v. Jarka Great Lakes
Corp., 37 F. Supp. 939 (W.D. Mich. 1941). Cf. Hudson v. Columbian Transfer Co., 137
Mich. 255, 100 N.W. 402 (1904), in which the goods were warehoused in a building other
than the one contemplated by the contract of storage. The goods were destroyed by fire
and the depositor's insurance did not cover the loss because of the change in place of
storage. It was held that the warehouseman was liable for breach of contract and implied
that due care on the part of the warehouseman would be no defense.
103 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-204 (2) (3). See part H-E supra.

MICHIGAN

LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

of the goods' arrival at destination and the consignee has had a
reasonable time for claim and removal. 194
VII.

THE BAILEE'S OBLIGATION OF DELIVERY

One of the most important questions regarding documents of
title involves the circumstances under which the bailee is relieved
from liability for failure to deliver the goods. These excuses for
delivery are found in various sections of the current Michigan
statutes. 9 5 The Code undertakes a comprehensive revision and sets
forth excuses for non-delivery in sections 7-403 and 7-404. Under
the Code the bailee is required to deliver the goods to the person
entitled to them under the document unless one of the following
listed excuses is established by the bailee.
"Delivery of the Goods to a Person Whose Receipt Was
Rightful as Against the Claimant"'190
This clause covers the case where goods are warehoused by a
person not entitled to them, such as a thief, and returned to the
owner upon his demand,'9 7 and would not change Michigan law.198
It is assumed here that the owner has not acted in a way which
would prevent him from later claiming tide. 99
A.

"Damage to or Delay, Loss or Destruction of the Goods
for Which the Bailee Is Not Liable [, but the Burden of
EstablishingNegligence in Such Cases Is on the
Person Entitled Under the Document] ' 200
Under this heading falls the bailee's excuse that it has observed
the required standard of care already discussed but that the goods
B.

have nevertheless been damaged or destroyed. 20 1 This subsection

would not change Michigan law.20 2
v. Grand Trunk Ry., 133 Mich. 187, 94 N.W. 739 (1903); Barber v.
'Stapleton
Detroit, G.H. & M. Ry., 197 Mich. 643, 164 N.W. 377 (1917); [1915] MICH. ATr'Y GEN. REP.
550.

19 5 See UNIFORM WARiHousE RFcmxrs Acts §§ 8-12, 16, 19, MicH. Coax". LAws §§ 443.8.12, .16, .19 (1948), MxcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.428-.432, .436, .439 (1959), and UNIFORm BILs
OF LADING Acr §§ 11-15, 19, 22, MicH.Comp.LAWs §§ 482.11-.15, .19, .22 (1948), MxcK. STAT.
ANN.§§ 22.1131-.1135, .1139, .1142 (1937).
(a).
196 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-403 (1)
197 Cf. Roehl Storage Co. v. Wilson, 268 Mich. 691, 256 N.W. 598 (1934); UNIFORM
Coaammm.L CODE § 7-403, comment 2.
198 UNIFORM WAREIOUSE REcFna'TS ACr § 9 (a), Mxic. Coi'. LAws § 443.9 (a) (1948),
MIcH.STAT. ANN. § 19.429 (a) (1959), UNiFORM BmLs OF LADNG Acr § 12 (a), Mxcii. Coip.
LAws § 482.12 (a) (1948) , Mici. STAT. ANN. § 22.1132 (a) (1937).
199 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-403, comment 2; cf. §§ 7-503 (1), -504 (1).
200 UNIFOp.
COMMERciAL CODE § 7-403 (1 (b).
201 See part VI supra.
202 UNIFORM WARsousE REnmS Aar §§ 8, 21, MICH. Cozip. LAws §§ 443.8, .21
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The language inside the brackets is optional and was included
because there is a substantial conflict on this point among the
20 3
various states and uniformity here was not considered essential.
The present Michigan statutes place the burden of proving the
existence of an excuse on the warehouseman or carrier.20 4 In the

case of goods deposited with a warehouseman which are later
found to be damaged, the decisions indicate that the claimant must
show that the goods were deposited in good condition and then
the burden is placed upon the warehouseman to prove that the
loss was not caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care.205
An analogous rule is applicable to carriers 20 6 and adoption of the
Code without the optional language would not change Michigan
law.
C. "Previous Sale or Other Disposition of the Goods in
Lawful Enforcement of a Lien or on Warehouseman's
207
Lawful Terminationof Storage"
This is in accord with Michigan law. 20

The extent of the right

dispose of the goods is discussed in followto sell or otherwise
20 9
ing sections.
D. "The Exercise by the Seller of His Right To Stop Delivery
Pursuant to the Provisions of the Article on Sales
(Section 2-705)"210

While the right of stoppage is currently recognized in Michigan,211 there is no express provision that rightful exercise of this
privilege would provide an excuse for the bailee. Such an excuse
(1948), Mxc. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.248, .441 (1959); UNIFORM BILs OF LADING ACr § 11, MICH.
CoMP. LAws § 482.11 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1131 (1937).
203 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-403, comment 3.
204 UNIFORM WAREHOUSE Rnc:IFwrs Acr § 8 (c), MICH. CoMP. LAWS §443.8 (c)

(1948),

MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.428(c) (1959); UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING Acr § 11 (c), MfICH. COMP.
LAWS § 482.11 (c) (1948), MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1131 (c) (1937).
205 Schwartz v. Michigan Warehouse Co., 219 Mich. 401, 189 N.V. 1 (1922); Rath
Packing Co. v. Cold Storage Co., 222 Mich. 315, 192 N.W. 639 (1923); Price & Pierce,
Ltd. v. Jarka Great Lakes Corp., 37 F. Supp. 939 (W.D. Mich. 1941); Thomas Canning
Co. v. Pere Marquette Co., 211 Mich. 326, 178 N.W. 85 (1920).
206 A. F. Young &cCo. v. Grand Rapids & Ind. Ry., 201 Mich. 39, 167 N.V. 11 (1918);
see also 3 CALLAGHAN'S MICHIGAN PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 36.157 (1946).
207 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-403 (1) (c).
208 UNIFORM WAREHOUSE R CEIrs Acr § 36, MIcH. COMp. LAws § 443.36 (1948), MICH.

STAT. ANN. § 19.456 (1959); UNIFORM Bu.is OF LADING Aar § 27, MICH. Comp. LAws § 482.27
(1948), MicH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1147 (1937).
209 See parts VIII and IX infra.
210 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-403

(1) (d).

211 UNIFORM SALEs Aar §§ 57-59, MIcH. COMP. LAWS

ANN. §§

19.297--299 (1959).

§§ 440.57-.59 (1948),
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would come under the catch-all of delivery to a person lawfully
entitled to the goods.2

12

Since under the Code the existence of

the excuse depends upon the validity of the stoppage, 213 the bailee
is given a right to recover from the seller damages incurred by
honoring an improper order to stop.2 14 There is no present Mich-

igan statute giving such a right.
E.

"A Diversion, Reconsignment or Other Disposition Pursuant
to the Provisions of This Article (Section 7-303) or Tariff
Regulating Such Rights"215

The practice of diversion and reconsignment has already been
briefly mentioned in discussing the rights of the original consignee
against the substituted consignee under a straight bill of lading.2 16
The carrier's liability for honoring a change in directions by either
the consignor or consignee is the second aspect of this problem.
The UBLA, currently in force in Michigan, authorizes delivery
by the carrier either to the person lawfully entitled to the goods,
the consignee under a non-negotiable bill, or the person in possession of a properly indorsed negotiable bill of lading.217 There are sit-

uations in which the carrier may have notice that there are adverse
claims to the goods. This can happen when a seller attempts to
divert and the buyer objects. If the carrier knows or has notice
that there are conflicting claims to the goods it may safely deliver
only to the person lawfully entitled to them.218

In practice this

may force the carrier to retain the goods until the conflicting claims
are resolved.2 19 In an attempt to permit prompt disposition of the

goods, the Code sets forth circumstances under which the carrier
may deliver the goods and be protected from misdelivery.
212UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS Acr § 9(a), MICH. CoaP. LAws § 443.9 (a) (1948),
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.429 (a) (1959); UNIFORM BMs OF LADING Acr § 12 (a), MICH. CoMp.
LAws § 482.12 (a) (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1132 (a) (1937).
213 The use of the term "right to stop" in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-403 (1) (d)
indicates that unless the right actually exists under § 2-705, the bailee is not given an
excuse. Section 2-705, comment 1, merely states the bailee may be liable to buyer if the
stoppage is unjustified.

214 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-705 (3) (b), 7-504(4), comment 1.
215 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-403 (1) (e).

216 Part IV-H supra.
217 UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING Acr § 12, MICH. Comp. LAws § 482.12 (1948), MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 22.1132 (1937).
218 UNIFORM BILus OF LADING ACT § 13, MICH. CoMp. LAws § 482.13 (1948), MIC.
STAT. ANN. § 22.1133 (1937).
9
21 See BRAUCHER, DOCUMENTS OF TrrLE 39 (1958).
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Even when there are conflicting instructions the carrier is
protected if it delivers to the holder of a negotiable bill or the consignor on a non-negotiable bill.220 In the absence of conflicting
instructions it may deliver to the consignee on a non-negotiable
bill if the goods have either arrived at the billed destination or if
the consignee is in possession of the bill.221 It may also still follow
the instructions of the consignee on a non-negotiable bill and take
the chance that it will be determined that the consignee was en222
titled to them.
As to both carriers and warehouseman, the Code continues present permission for use of an action of interpleader by the bailee
and the carrier may avail itself of this alternative when there are
223
conflicting claims.
F. "Release, Satisfaction or Any Other Fact Affording a Personal
224
Defense Against the Claimant;and Any Other Lawful Excuse"

These last two clauses are designed to cover any other valid
acts by the bailee. The phrase "and any other lawful excuse" was
added because of fears expressed by bailees that they might be
subjected to double liability
if they surrendered goods under com5
pulsion of legal process.

22

Section 7-404 provides the last protection for the bailee.
"A bailee who in good faith including observance of
reasonable commercial standards has received goods and
delivered or otherwise disposed of them according to the terms
of the document or pursuant to this Article is not liable
therefor. This rule applies even though the person from
whom he received the goods has no authority to procure the
document or to dispose of the goods and even though the person to whom he delivered the goods had no authority to receive them."
220 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
221 UNIFORM

§ 7-303

(1) (a), (b).

COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-303 (1) (c).

222 UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-303 (1) (d).
223 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-603. Cf. UNFORM WAREHOUSE REcETs Acr §§ 17,
18, M mCt.COMP. LAWs §§ 443.17, .18 (1948), MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.437, .438 (1959);
UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING Acr §§ 20, 21, MicaH. CoMP. LAws

§§ 482.20, .21

(1948), MICH.

STAT. ANN. §§ 22.1140, .1141 (1937).
224 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-403 (1) (f), (g). In Bunnel v. Ward, 241 Mich. 404,
217 N.W. 68 (1928), a warehouseman delivered goods represented by a negotiable receipt
to one member of the partnership without canceling the receipt. The warehouseman was
held not liable to the other partner on the ground that delivery could probably be made
to one partner as bailor. This is an example of an excuse under § 7-403 (1) (f).
225 Braucher, In Re Article 7, 28 TMp. L.Q. 565, 573-75 (1955).
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In Adel Precision Products Corp. v. Grand Trunk W.R.R. 22
the carrier was held liable when it delivered goods against an order
bill of lading on which the necessary indorsement had been forged.
The comment to section 7-404 appears to indicate a contrary re227

sult.

Where there are conflicting claims section 7-404 might protect
the bailee if he delivered to the claimant not entitled to them but
claiming under the document. It has been suggested, however,
that "observance of reasonable commercial standards" requires
the bailee to force judicial resolution of the quarrel through an
228
action of interpleader.
Section 31 of the UWRA229 states expressly that a condition
of the right to demand goods is satisfaction of the warehouseman's
lien and the warehouseman may withhold possession until it is so
satisfied. Under the Code the lien must be satisfied if the bailee
requests or if the bailee is prohibited by law from delivering without payment. 230 There is no express statement that the claimant
must satisfy the lien. The bailee's right to detain until paid is implied.231
The Code [and this is also true in Michigan at present] requires the claimant to surrender outstanding negotiable documents
for cancellation or notation of partial delivery. If the bailee does
not insist upon this, he will be liable to any person to whom the
document is duly negotiated. 23 2 The bailee need not obtain surrender of the document when it has conferred no right in the goods
against the claimant. 233 The UWRA and UBLA provide that after
the bailee has lawfully disposed of the goods to satisfy his lien or
because of their perishable quality he shall not thereafter be liable
226 332 Mich. 519, 51 N.W. 922 (1952) (applying federal law).
227 "The section applies to delivery to a fraudulent holder of a valid document as
well as to the holder of an invalid document." UNIFORM COMmERCIAL CODE § 7-404, comment. But see BRAuCHER, Docu a'rs oF TrrL= 32 (1958).
228 BRAucnm, DocuruTx's OF TrLE 33 (1958).
22DMicH. ComP. LAWS § 443.31 (1948), Mici. STAT. ANN. § 19A51 (1959). See also
UNIFORM WARHousE REcEHrs AC § 8 (a), Micn. Comp. LAws § 443.8 (a) (1948), MieH.
STAT. ANN. § 19.428 (a) (1959); UNIFORM BLLS OF LADING ACT § 11 (a), Micn. CoMp. LAwS

§ 482.11 (a) (1948), MicH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1131 (a) (1937).
230 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-403 (2).
23

1UNIFORI, COMMERCIAL CODE §

7-209,

comment

232 UNIFORM COMMERCAL CODE § 7-403 (3).

4.

Cf. UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECImPTS ACr

§ 12, MicH. COMP. LAws §443.12 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.432 (1959); UNIFORM BILLS
OF LADING ACE § 15, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 482.15 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1135
(1937). See also MICH. CoMp. LAws § 444.8 (1948), MICE. STAT. ANN. § 19.498 (1959).
233 See UNIFORM COMMERCIL CODE § 7-503 (1) (a).
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for non-delivery even to a holder of a negotiable document.23 4
These present sections have no counterpart in the Code but it is
clear that the same rule of no duty to cancel the outstanding docu235
ment would apply.

The Code compels the bailee, in the absence of a valid excuse,
to deliver the goods to the holder of a negotiable document or
the person to whom delivery is to be made by the terms of, or pursuant to, written instructions under a non-negotiable document. 230
It should be noted that due negotiation is not needed to be a
holder. The only requirements are that he be in possession of a
237
properly indorsed document of title.
This section compels the bailee only to make delivery of what
he has. Examination of other sections of article 7 shows that if the
goods are misdescribed the bailee will be liable only to a party
to or purchaser for value of a warehouse receipt,238 the consignee
under a non-negotiable bill of lading who has given value in good
faith, or the holder through due negotiation of a negotiable bill
239
of lading.
Current Michigan statutes expressly authorize the bailee to demand a receipt upon delivery. 240 The Code does not continue this
provision but a comment indicates recognition that this practice
241
may continue.
VIII.

THE WAREHOUSEMAN'S RIGHT

Section 34 of the

UWRA242

To

TERMINATE STORAGE

defines the right of a Michigan

warehouseman to terminate storage of goods. The right is given in
three cases: where the goods are perishable, where they will deteriorate greatly in value, or where because of odor, leakage, in234 UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEnTS Acr § 36, MIcH. Comp. LAws § 443.36 (1948), MiCH.
STAT. ANN. § 19.456 (1959); UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING Acr § 27, MICH. CoMP. LAws
§ 482.27 (1948), MicI. STAT. ANN. § 22.1147 (1937).
235 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-403, comment 5. Cf. §§ 7-206 (4), (5), -210 (3), (6),

.308 (2), (5).
236 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
237 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 7-403 (1), (4).
§ 1-201 (20). Cf. § 7-501 (4).
7-203.

238 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

239 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

CODE

§ 7-501 (1). Under this section, the consignee under

a negotiable bill could not recover from the carrier unless he took the bill through due
negotiation. Cf. § 7-501 (2) (b), (4).
240 UNIFORM WVAREHOUSE RECEIPTS Acr § 8 (c), MICH. COMP. LAWS § 443.8 (c) (1948),
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.428 (c) (1959); UNIFORM BrLS OF LADING ACr § 11 (c), MxcH. COMP.
LAws § 482.11 (c) (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1131 (c) (1937).
241 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-104 comment.
242

MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 443.34 (1948), MICHx.

STAT. ANN.

§ 19.454 (1959).
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flammability, or explosive nature they are likely to injure other
property. If the goods are within one of the three above classes,
the warehouseman must give reasonable notice to the owner or
nominal depositor and if removal is not made during the period
specified by the warehouseman, he may sell at public or private
sale or otherwise dispose of them without liability. An earlier
statute giving a right to dispose of perishable property held by a
the current compilations but is
warehouseman is also found in
243
today.
applicable
not
probably
The Code revises this right to terminate storage in several respects. First, a general right is granted which applies to all goods
stored. The warehouseman has a right to require removal at the
end of the specified storage period or at the end of thirty days if
no storage period is named. He must notify all known claimants
to the goods and if they are not removed, he may sell them in accordance with the provisions provided for enforcement of his
lien.2 44 The granting of this right would change Michigan law,
for no general right to require removal exists at present. Second,
the warehouseman is given a supplementary right to terminate
storage where he believes in good faith that the goods will deteriorate or fall in value below the amount of his lien within a
period which is shorter than the period in which he could dispose of the goods under his general right of termination already
mentioned. If he exercises this right, he may specify a shorter
reasonable time and sell the goods one week after the expiration
of the period specified in his notice.245 Again the Code would
change Michigan law. The right of termination based on the
perishable quality of the goods is strictly limited to a case of decline in value below the amount of the lien instead of a great loss
in value not necessarily impairing the lien. While this restricts
action by warehousemen, the restriction is not onerous since the
general right to terminate still exists.
Another supplementary right of termination is given in cases
where the goods are hazardous. The sale may be public or private
on reasonable notice. Again the Code would restrict the action
of warehousemen because this right can be exercised only if the
warehouseman had no notice of the quality or condition of the
243 MIcH. COMP. LAws § 444.22 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.512 (1959). This provision antedates passage of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, and should be considered
as repealed by implication.
244 UNIFORM CoMMER C AL CODE § 7-206 (1).
aEcuAL CODE § 7-206 (2).
245 UNIFORM CoM
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goods at the time of storage.2 4 6 The theory is that the summary
power of removal is not justified when the warehouseman accepted
the goods knowing of the risk they involved.2 4 7 Of course, he may
still avail himself of the general right of termination even though
he had knowledge of the hazardous quality of goods at the time of
deposit. In the interim period he would have to store the goods
elsewhere to avoid loss to other depositors.
At present there are separate provisions in Michigan for the
sale of unclaimed and perishable goods by carriers.2 48 No such
distinction is recognized by the Code and no provision is made
for termination of storage by a carrier. Under the Code the carrier
would have a right to terminate storage and dispose of the goods
only after it had acquired the status of a warehouseman. Consolidated treatment is used here since the carrier seeking to dispose
of the goods is really seeking to terminate its status as a warehouseman.
IX.

THE BAILEE's LIEN

The final point for comparison is the extent of the lien which
may be claimed for storage and shipment of the goods. The treatment of the warehouseman's lien under the Code will be explained.
and then any differences in the carrier's lien will be noted.
A.

The Warehouseman's Lien

At present the warehouseman may claim two types of lien, a
specific lien for charges relating to certain goods or a general lien
on the same goods for charges relating to other goods of the same
2 49
Where a negotiable receipt is issued, the warehousedepositor..

man can claim only a specific lien for storage subsequent to the
246 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-206 (3).
247 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-206, comments 2 and 3.
248 UNIFORM BiLns OF LADING Acr § 27, MICHi. CoMP. LAWS

§ 482.27 (1948), MfIcH.
ANN. § 22.1147 (1937), provides that the carrier will not be liable for failure to
deliver goods lawfully sold because they are perishable or hazardous but does not state
the conditions under which they may be sold. Other statutes fill out the picture. MICH.
CoMip. LAWS § 464.13 (1948), MicH. STAT ANN. § 22.216 (1937) (sale of unclaimed freight
and baggage, special provision for perishable goods); MiCH. Comip. LAws §§ 434.101-.112
(1918), MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 18.721-.732 (1957) (disposition of unclaimed property); MAic.
Cosup. LAws § 468.321 (1948), MieH. STAT. ANN. § 22.751 (1937) (sale of animals and
perishable freight by common carriers).
2-40 UNIFORM WAREHOUSES REcEnrs Acr §§ 27, 28(a), MAiCH. CoarP. LAWs §§ 443.27,
.28 (a) (1948), Mien. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.447, .448 (a) (1959).
STAT.

[(Vol. 59

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

date of the receipt unless250 he expressly enumerates the charges

which he wishes to claim.

The Code recognizes the existence of251both a specific and general
lien but makes the following changes:
1. A general lien can be claimed, even in a negotiable
receipt, merely by so stating but,
2. Where a receipt is duly negotiated, the charges
against the goods can be enforced only where there is a statement of a specific amount and rate, otherwise there can be a
charge only for reasonable storage charges subsequent to the
date of the receipt.
The Code departs from present law by providing specifically
that the warehouseman may also reserve a security interest in the
goods deposited. This will be used by the warehouseman who is
also in the financing business. The warehouse receipt must specify
the maximum amount for which a security interest is claimed but
in all other respects the validity of the security interest and rights
on default will be governed by article 9 of the Code which deals
252
with secured transactions.

Where goods are deposited by a person other than the owner
and the warehouseman asserts a lien, the validity of his lien rests
upon whether the depositor could have made a pledge of the goods

which would have been valid254as against the true owner. 253 This
test is continued by the Code.

The warehouseman would continue to lose his lien by volun-

tary delivery or by unjustified refusal to deliver. 25 5

The Code

further specifically provides that the general lien attaches to the
balance of goods remaining in the hands of the warehouseman. 25 6
B. Enforcement of the Warehouseman'sLien
Unlike the UWRA 257 the Code provides two sale procedures
for the enforcement of a warehouseman's lien, one much more lib250 UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEIPTs Acr § 30, MICi. CoMP. LAWS

§ 443.30 (1948), MICH.

STAT. ANN. § 19.450 (1959).
251 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-209 (1).
252 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-209 (2).
253 UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEITS ACr § 28 (b), MICH. CoMP. LAws § 443.28 (b) (1948),
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.448 (b) (1959); cf. Roehl Storage Co. v. Wilson, 268 Mich. 691, 256

N.W. 598 (1934).

§

254 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-209 (3).
255 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-209(4); Cf. UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RE EnPrS Acr
29, MICH. Comlp. LAws § 443.29 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.449 (1959); Collins v.

Kent Storage Co., 228 Mich. 137, 199 N.W. 634 (1924).

256 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-209(1).
257 UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEIPTs ACT § 33, MICH. CoMP. LAws

STAT. ANN. §

19.453 (1959).

§ 443.33 (1948), MICH.
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era! than the other. The first alternative permits a public or
private sale on terms which are commercially reasonable after
notification of all known claimants. 258 However, the warehouse-

man may use this procedure only if the goods have been stored
by a merchant in the ordinary course of his business. 259 Liens
on goods of all other depositors must be enforced under the second alternative which involves more steps and carefully laid out
procedure. 20( The first alternative is simpler but where the warethe status of his depositor he may use
houseman has doubts about
28 1
the second alternative.
Apart from technical revision and simplification of the sale
procedure, the Code makes a few changes and clarifications. The
warehouseman is specifically given the right to bid at a public
sale; 26 2 by negative implication he is denied the right to bid at a
private sale. 28 3 Further, the title of a purchaser in good faith at
the foreclosure sale is protected although the seller fails to comply
with all the technical requirements of the statute.26 4 This is an

attempt to make such sales more attractive and to obtain better
prices. 265
C.

The Carrier'sLien

The Code grants a carrier a specific lien somewhat more limited
than the one granted to a warehouseman. 2 6 Where a negotiable
bill of lading is issued for the goods, as against a purchaser for
in the bill or tariffs
value, the carrier is limited to charges stated
267
or to a reasonable charge if none are stated.
No provision is made for a general lien or security interest in
favor of a carrier because carriers do not commonly claim a lien
for services performed in connection with other goods nor do they
lend money. However, if the practice of the carriers is otherwise,
the Code would not deny them a general lien or security interest
which was valid under other state law.268
258 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
25
9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
260 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
1
26 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
282 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
263 BAiucHER, DocumE~rs
284 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
265 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
268 UNIFORM COMMERCIL
OF Ti E 43 (1958).
267 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

OF TITLE 50
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

duly negotiated).
2e8 UNIFORM

§ 7-210 (1).
§ 7-210 (2).
§ 7-210(2).
§ 7-210 (8).
§ 7-210(4).

COMMERCIAL CODE

(1958).
§ 7-210 (5).

7-210, comment 2; cf. §§ 2-706(5), 9-504(4).
7.307 (1); cf. § 7-209 (1). See BPlAuCm, DOCUMENTS

j

7-307 (1); cf. § 7-209 (1) (lien limited when receipt

§ 7-307, comment; cf. § 7-105.

754

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

Where a carrier is required by law to accept goods for transportation, its specific lien is valid as against any person unless the
carrier had notice that the consignor lacked the authority to ship
the goods. If the carrier is not required to accept the goods, the
specific lien is valid against anybody entrusting possession to the
consignor unless the carrier has notice of lack of authority to
ship.269 This would change Michigan law.
In Fitch v. Newberry270 plaintiffs sued a carrier in replevin for
goods which it had carried from Troy, New York, to Detroit. The
carrier would not release the goods until it was paid for the carriage. The plaintiffs had advanced the freight charges to X who had
sent the goods without prepayment from Troy. The carrier argued
that since it was required to accept the goods for delivery it should
have a lien for freight charges. The court rejected the carrier's
claim on the theory that it was required to accept the goods only
when the consignor had power to subject them to a lien for freight
charges. Since there was no authority in X to do this, the carrier
was not required to accept and judgment was for the plaintiffs.
Under the Code, the carrier would prevail.
D. Enforcement of the Carrier'sLien
The carrier is given a right to sell the goods which is similar
to the first alternative for warehouseman, namely the right to sell
in a commercially reasonable manner.2 7 1 Moreover, because the

carriers were worried about the vagueness of the term "commercially reasonable," they were given authority to use the more detailed and strict second alternative available to warehouseman.2 7 2
CONCLUSION

In retrospect, article 7 does not appear to be revolutionary in
concept. Of course, the new terminology and statutory scheme will
be in some respects alien to those accustomed to the present uniform acts. On the other hand, it seems that this article as a whole
is a well constructed improvement on the current statutes. While
the Uniform Commercial Code must finally be judged on its ten
articles as a unit, article 7 supports a favorable view of the statute.
269

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
270 1 Doug. 1 (Mich. Sup.
271 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL.
272 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

564, 571 (1955).

CODE

§ 7-307 (2).

Ct. 1843).
CODE § 7-308.
CODE § 7-307 (7). Braucher, In Re Article 7, 28 TEMP.

L.Q.

